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ABSTRACT
We use a large data set of deductible choices in auto insurance contracts to estimate the distribution
of risk preferences in our sample. To do so, we develop a structural econometric model, which
accounts for adverse selection by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in both risk (probability
of an accident) and risk aversion. Ex-post claim information separately identifies the marginal
distribution of risk, while the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion is identified by the
deductible choice. We find that individuals in our sample have on average an estimated absolute risk
aversion which is higher than other estimates found in the literature. Using annual income as a
measure of wealth, we find an average two-digit coefficient of relative risk aversion. We also find
that women tend to be more risk averse than men, that proxies for income and wealth are positively
related to absolute risk aversion, that unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences is higher relative
to that of risk, and that unobserved risk is positively correlated with unobserved risk aversion.
Finally, we use our results for counterfactual exercises that assess the profitability of insurance
contracts under various assumptions.
Alma Cohen
Analysis Group










leinav@stanford.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The analysis of decisions under uncertainty is central to economics. Indeed, expected utility theory,
which is typically used to explain such decisions through the use of risk aversion, is one of the
discipline’s most celebrated theories.1 But how risk averse are individuals? How heterogeneous
are individuals’ attitudes towards risk? How do they vary with individuals’ characteristics? These
are all questions, which, somewhat surprisingly, have received only little attention in empirical
microeconomics.
Much of the existing evidence about risk preferences is based on introspection, laboratory ex-
periments,2 data on bettors or television game show participants,3 answers given by individuals
to hypothetical survey questions,4 and estimates that are driven by the imposed functional-form
relationship between static risk taking behavior and inter-temporal substitution.5 We believe that
supporting these ﬁndings using direct evidence from risky decisions made by actual market partic-
ipants is important.
In this study we estimate risk preferences from the choice of deductible in auto insurance
contracts. In particular, we exploit a rich data set of more than 100,000 individuals choosing from
an individual-speciﬁc menu of four deductible-premium combinations oﬀered by an Israeli auto
insurance company. An individual who chooses low deductible is exposed to less risk, but is faced
with higher level of expected expenditure. Thus, the decision to choose the low (high) deductible
provides a lower (upper) bound for the coeﬃcient of (absolute) risk aversion for each individual.
Variation in the deductible-premium choices available to each individual in our data allows us to
identify the distribution of the attitudes towards risk in our sample.
Obtaining measures of risk aversion from participants in insurance markets is particularly im-
portant, as risk aversion is the primary reason for the existence of such markets. Thus, measuring
risk aversion and its interaction with risk will have direct and important implications for proﬁtabil-
ity of market participants, for market eﬃciency, and for potential policy interventions. Therefore,
to the extent that it may not be straightforward to extrapolate utility parameters from one market
context to another, it seems useful to obtain such parameters from the same markets to which they
are subsequently applied.
In our view, the deductible choice is (almost) an ideal setting for estimating risk aversion from
insurance data. Other decisions in an insurance context may involve additional preference-based
explanations for coverage choice, which are unrelated to ﬁnancial risk and will make inference about
1Notwhistanding the recent debate about the empirical relevance of expected utility theory (Rabin, 2000; and
Rabin and Thaler, 2001), which is discussed later.
2See, for example, Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992), Smith and Walker (1993), and Holt and Laury (2002).
3See Gertner (1993), Metrick (1995), Jullien and Salanie (2000), and Beetsma and Schotman (2001).
4See, for example, Viscusi and Evans (1990), Evans and Viscusi (1991), Barsky et al. (1997), Donkers et al.
(2001), and Hartog et al. (2002) .
5Much of the ﬁnance and macroeconomics literature, going back to Friend and Blume (1975), relies on this
assumption. As noted by Kocherlakota (1996) in a review of this literature, the level of static risk aversion is still a
fairly open question.
1risk aversion more diﬃcult. This is the case for the choice among health plans, annuities, or just
whether to insure or not.6 In contrast, the choice among diﬀerent alternatives that vary only in
their ﬁnancial parameters (namely the levels of deductibles and premia) is a case in which the eﬀect
of risk aversion can be more plausibly isolated and estimated.
We are aware of only few attempts to recover risk preferences from decisions of regular market
participants. Saha (1997) looks at ﬁrms’ production decisions, and Chetty (2004) recovers risk
preferences from labor supply decisions. The important study by Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) is
probably the closest work to ours. They look at individuals’ decisions whether or not to insure
against failure of inside telephone wires. The cost of the insurance they analyze is 45 cents per
month, and it covers a damage of about 55 dollars, which occurs with probability of 0.005 per
month. In our auto insurance data events are more frequent and commonly observed, stakes are
higher, the potential loss (the diﬀerence between the deductible amounts) is known, and the choice
we analyze is more immune to alternative preference-based explanations. Our paper also diﬀers
in its methodology; in particular, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences, while
Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) do not.7
Heterogeneity in risk preferences is not, of course, the only possible explanation for deductible
choices. Heterogeneity in accident risk (adverse selection) should also be accounted for. The average
deductible-premium menu in our data oﬀers an individual to pay an additional premium of $55
in order to save $182 in deductible payments, in the event of a claim. This menu implies that
a risk-neutral individual should choose higher coverage (low deductible) if and only if her claim
propensity is 55
182 = 30% or more. As the average annual claim propensity for individuals in our data
is 24.5%, this additional coverage is actuarially unfair. Despite this, about 18% of the individuals
we observe choose to pay for the lower deductible. Within the expected utility framework, and
abstracting from moral hazard (see later), this can happen for one of two reasons: these individuals
have either higher risk exposure (claim propensity) than the average individual, or have higher risk
aversion, or both. Ex-post claim information is used to identify between these two possibilities,
and to estimate the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion.8
Two important aspects of the data should be noted. First, we observe all the variables that
are observed by the insurance company. Therefore, at least in principle, once we condition on
observables, any remaining variation in the deductible-premium menus oﬀered to consumers is
econometrically exogenous: it cannot depend on unobserved characteristics of consumers. Second,
6For example, Rabin and Thaler (2001, footnote 2) point out that one of their colleagues buys the insurance
analyzed by Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) in order to improve the service he will get in the event of a claim. We think
that our deductible choice analysis is immune to such critic.
7The possibility of using deductibles to make inference about risk aversion was ﬁrst pointed out by Dreze (1981),
who suggested a diﬀerent strategy from the one we employ. While we rely on individuals’ choices of deductibles
(“demand side” information), Dreze (1981) suggested a method that relies on the optimality of the observed contracts
(“supply side” information).
8Through most of the paper we assume that individuals perfectly know their risk types. Later in the paper we also
consider heterogeneity in the information individuals have regarding their risk types, and show that the qualitative
results of the paper are not very sensitive to the complete information assumption.
2we have data on the ex-post realization of the number of claims for each policy. This helps us
identify the model; it allows us to estimate the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion, thereby
accounting for adverse selection in the choice of deductibles. Loosely speaking, the distribution of
claims identiﬁes the marginal distribution of risk types. This distribution allows us to compute the
posterior distribution (conditional on the number of claims) of risk types for each individual, and
to integrate over it when we analyze the individual’s deductible choice. This accounts for adverse
selection, as individuals with more claims will have a less favorable posterior risk distribution. Such
distribution will make these individuals more likely to choose higher coverage (lower deductible),
even in the absence of heterogeneity in risk aversion.
The majority of the existing adverse selection literature addresses the important question of
whether adverse selection exists in diﬀerent insurance markets. As suggested by the inﬂuential
work of Chiappori and Salanie (2000), it uses “reduced form” speciﬁcations to test whether, after
controlling for observables, outcomes and coverage choices are signiﬁcantly correlated.9 As our
main goal is quite diﬀerent, we take a more structural approach. By assuming a particular struc-
ture for the adverse selection mechanism, we can account for it when estimating the distribution in
risk preferences, which is the main objective of the paper. Moreover, while the structure of adverse
selection is assumed, its existence and relative importance are not imposed; the structural assump-
tions allow us to estimate the importance of adverse selection relative to the selection induced by
unobserved heterogeneity in risk attitudes.10
The structural assumptions also allow us to estimate the correlation between risk type and
risk aversion. Recently, it has been argued11 that a negative correlation between risk aversion
and risk types may be the reason why several other important studies (for example, Chiappori
and Salanie, 2000) did not ﬁnd empirical evidence for adverse selection in insurance markets. Our
analysis provides direct evidence about this important relationship; our estimate of strong positive
correlation between risk and risk aversion suggests that, at least in our data, ignoring heterogeneity
in risk preferences will go in the other way: it will make us even more likely to ﬁnd evidence for
adverse selection.12
We make two important assumptions throughout the paper. First, we assume that by choosing
the low deductible, in the event of an accident the individual “gains” the diﬀerence between the
high and the low deductible. This is not completely true, as with some probability the amount
of the claim would fall between these two deductible levels, so the individual should, in principle,
take into account the loss distribution when it falls in this range. Our data include, however,
9See also Puelz and Snow (1994), Finkelstein and McGarry (2003), and Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), as well as
Cohen (2005) for our data.
10This approach is somewhat similar to that of Cardon and Hendel (2001). In our discussion of identiﬁcation
(Section 3.3) we discuss the conceptual similarities and diﬀerences in more detail.
11See De Meza and Webb (2001), Finkelstein and McGarry (2003), Jullien, Salanie, and Salanie (2003), and Israel
(2005).
12Throughout the paper we use the term “adverse selection” to denote selection on risk, while selection on risk
aversion is just “selection.” Some of the literature calls both of these selection mechanisms “adverse selection,” with
the distinction being between “common values” (selection on risk) and “private values” (selection on risk aversion).
3the amount of the claim, and analyzing the claim amounts of those individuals who chose low
deductibles suggests that only one percent of the claims made would not have been worthy to ﬁle
with the higher deductible level, thereby making our assumption not very restrictive. This is true
even when taking into account the (small, in Israel) dynamic costs of ﬁling a claim through its
eﬀect on experience rating. The second assumption we make is to abstract from moral hazard. By
introspection we do not think that moral hazard plays an important role in this setting.13 While
behavior may be aﬀected by the decision whether to insure or not, the deductible choice is less
likely to aﬀect behavior. Furthermore, if moral hazard exists, our data cannot separately identify
it from adverse selection unless we impose additional structural restrictions. Moral hazard can be
separately identiﬁed only if one observed the behavior of the same individual after (exogenously)
making diﬀerent contract choices.14 Finally, one should note that the introduction of moral hazard
to the setup is likely to reduce the attractiveness of a low deductible, thereby biasing our estimates
of risk aversion downwards. In that case, our estimate can be viewed as a lower bound on the true
level of risk aversion. These assumptions and their implications are discussed in more detail in
Section 5.
In our benchmark model we assume that individuals have full information about both their
risk exposure and their level of risk aversion, and that claims are the realization of a Poisson
process with individual-speciﬁcc l a i mr a t e . 15 The assumption that claims are generated by a one-
parameter distribution is crucial, as it allows us to uniquely back out the distribution of risk types
from only claim data. This assumption facilitates the identiﬁcation of unobserved heterogeneity in
risk preferences. For computational convenience, we also assume that the joint distribution of risk
type and the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion follows a bivariate Lognormal distribution. We use
expected utility theory to characterize the deductible choice as a function of risk and risk aversion,
imposing minimal assumptions on the particular functional form of the vNM utility function. Thus,
conditional on the menu of deductible-premium combinations and on the (unobserved) individual-
speciﬁc risk, the deductible choice can be estimated using a simple Probit. While this set up is
somewhat similar to the ﬁrst-stage regression of a selection model (Heckman, 1979), there are two
important diﬀerences which make our empirical model more complicated. First, we do not observe
claim rate directly, but only a random realization of it. Thus, we need to integrate over the posterior
distribution of claim rates, conditional on the observed realization. Second, the claim rate enters
the “ﬁrst stage equation” not only through the correlation between the error terms, as in a typical
selection model, but also directly, as a result of adverse selection.16 These diﬀerences make the
estimation of our model by standard Likelihood techniques (or, alternatively, GMM) less attractive,
13This assumption is also consistent with Cohen and Einav (2003), who ﬁnd no evidence for behavioral response
to changes in seat belt laws.
14See also Chiaporri and Heckman (2000).
15The Poisson assumption may be violated if one is concerned about a dynamic change in incentives after the ﬁrst
accident. In such a case, if the timing of claims were available, one could replace the outcome variable by the time
until the ﬁrst accident, and repeat the same exercise.
16This structural component of the direct eﬀe c ti sa l s ow h a ti d e n t i ﬁes the level of risk aversion.
4as they would require us to separately compute unattractive integrals for each individual in our
data, and for each value of the parameters. Instead, we use Bayesian econometrics by applying
Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques and estimating the model using a Gibbs Sampler. This
approach only requires us to sample from truncated univariate Normal distributions, signiﬁcantly
reducing the computational burden.
Our estimates of the level of risk aversion are on average signiﬁcantly greater than other es-
timates in the literature. The mean level of the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion (translated
to dollar amounts) is 0.0016. This implies that a quadratic expected utility maximizer will be
indiﬀerent about participating in a lottery in which she gains $100 with probability 0.5 and loses
$61.3 with probability 0.5. Imposing a CARA expected utility function signiﬁcantly reduces this
estimate, but still keeps it at higher risk aversion levels than those estimated in the literature. For
example, the parameter estimates of Gertner (1993) and Metrick (1995) suggest that their repre-
sentative TV show participant will be indiﬀerent about participating in a 50-50 lottery of gain $100
lose $97 and gain $100 lose $99.3, respectively. Using the average annual income (in Israel) as a
measure of wealth, we ﬁnd an average two-digit coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, which, again,
is much higher than other estimates present in the literature. We also ﬁnd that risk aversion does
not signiﬁcantly change with age, that females are, on average, more risk averse than males, and
that diﬀerent proxies for higher income or wealth are associated with higher levels of risk aversion.
Turning to the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion, we have two important ﬁndings. First,
we ﬁnd that the unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is relatively much higher than that in
risk exposure. This ﬁnding reduces the importance of accounting for adverse selection in the design
of optimal auto insurance contracts. Second, conditional on observables, we ﬁnd that unobserved
risk has a strong positive correlation with unobserved risk aversion. This correlation is driven by
the fact that the number of claims and the propensity to choose higher coverage (low deductible)
are highly correlated in the data. Given our structural assumptions, the observed correlation is too
high to be explained only by adverse selection. The only other way the model can explain such
a strong correlation is through positive correlation between risk and risk aversion. We realize, of
course, that this positive correlation is somewhat counterintuitive. It is natural to speculate that
risk attitudes towards ﬁnancial decisions are related to risk attitudes that aﬀect driving behavior.
This by itself should lead to negative relationship between risk aversion and claim propensity. We
should note, however, that there are many other factors that aﬀect claim propensities, which may go
in the other direction. For example, wealthier people may be less risk averse and, at the same time,
have lower claim propensities due to, say, shorter commute. We do not observe individual wealth
or income, so such omitted factors may generate the positive correlation we ﬁnd. More generally,
we should note that as the measure of risk is very diﬀerent from one market context to another,
we do not think that these last ﬁndings about the joint distribution should necessarily generalize
to other insurance markets. One way in which auto insurance may be special is that extremely
cautious drivers may, in fact, expose themselves to greater risk. This is unlikely to happen in, say,
health or life insurance markets.
Our empirical strategy and results may also help in guiding the recent theoretical literature
5on multi-dimensional screening. Our model presents two dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity,
while the insurer has only a one-dimensional instrument for screening (price). This case is diﬀerent
from multi-dimensional screening in which the number of instruments is equal to the dimensions
in which individuals diﬀer.17 Therefore, by construction, optimal contracts will necessitate some
degree of “bunching”.18 The optimal shape of the contracts, however, will crucially depend on the
relative variance of the two dimensions, as well as on their correlation structure. In Section 4.3 we
use our estimation results to illustrate this point. We analyze the estimated proﬁts of the insurer
from oﬀering diﬀerent sets of deductible-premium combinations. We estimate that by oﬀering a
menu of contracts, rather than a single deductible-premium alternative, the operating proﬁts of
the insurer are higher by about 0.35%. The results also suggest that these additional proﬁts can
almost double by re-optimizing and increasing the level of the low deductible.
Much of our analysis focuses on estimating the absolute level of risk aversion. After all, this is
what is identiﬁed by the choices made in our data, and this is what is relevant for analyzing the
eﬀects of alternative pricing policies in the auto insurance market. Any claim about relative risk
aversion must employ additional assumptions about individuals’ wealth. This is for two reasons.
First, we do not directly observe individuals’ wealth, so we will need to make assumptions about
how wealth is related to the variables we do observe. Second, much of the recent debate about
the empirical relevance of expected utility theory has focused on identifying the relevant wealth
one uses in diﬀerent contexts.19 Our exercise is neutral with respect to either side of the debate.
In our view, the debate focuses on how the curvature of the vNM utility function varies with
wealth, or across diﬀerent settings. We only measure the curvature of the vNM utility function at
a particular wealth level, whatever this wealth level may be. By allowing unobserved heterogeneity
in this curvature across individuals, we place no conceptual restrictions on the relationship between
wealth and risk aversion. Our estimated distribution of risk preferences can be thought of as a
convolution of the distribution of (relevant) wealth and risk attitudes. We do not attempt to break
down the distribution into these two components.
More generally, one should view our two-dimensional space of risk type and risk aversion in
the context of the variables we use to identify it. In particular, we use claim data to identify risk
type, thereby leaving everything else to be interpreted as risk aversion. Thus, for example, over-
conﬁdence will be captured by a lower level of estimated risk aversion. At the conceptual level,
we do not think that this should be viewed as a problem, as long as the results are interpreted in
the right way.20 The interpretation may be more important once our results are extrapolated to
17Randomized insurance contracts (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1988; Landsberger and Meilijson, 1999) may provide a
second dimension to screen high risk aversion individuals from high risk. Such contracts, however, are not practical
in many markets.
18See Landsberger and Meilijson (1999), Smart (2000), Jullien, Salanie, and Salanie (2003), and Villeneueve (2003)
for some related theoretical results. From a theory standpoint, the tools provided by Armstrong (1999) will most
likely be useful for such analysis.
19See Rabin (2000), Rabin and Thaler (2001), Rubinstein (2001), Watt (2002), and Palacio-Huerta et al. (2003).
20In practice, of course, our particular interpretation leads us to impose a particular trade-oﬀ between risk and risk
aversion. Other interpretations would lead to similar, albeit diﬀerent, functional forms.
6other environments, in which those behavioral biases may potentially take a diﬀerent form.21 We
discuss this further in the concluding section. Finally, individuals may, of course, vary in other
dimensions. While any attempt to identify additional dimensions of heterogeneity will necessarily
rely on structural assumptions, we perform one important exercise as a robustness check of our
main results. In this exercise, we relax the assumption that individuals perfectly know their risk
types. Rather, they learn their risk type through a simple Bayesian learning model. This model
allows heterogeneity in the extent to which individuals know their own risk type at the time of the
deductible choice. The qualitative results remaint h es a m e .I nS e c t i o n5w ed i s c u s si nm o r ed e t a i l
the sensitivity of the results to this and other restrictions imposed in the benchmark model.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 lays out the structural
model, describes the estimation strategy, and discusses the identiﬁcation of the model. Section 4
describes the results and performs several robustness tests and counterfactual experiments. Section
5 provides an informal discussion of the sensitivity of the results to various key assumptions, and
Section 6 concludes.
2D a t a
2.1 General Description
We use data obtained from an insurance company that operates in the market for automobile
insurance in Israel. The data contain information about all 105,800 new policyholders who joined
the insurer and purchased (annual) policies from it during the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the company’s
operation, from November 1994 to October 1999. Although many of these individuals stayed
with the insurer in subsequent years, we restrict attention to the deductible choices made by each
individual in her ﬁrst contract with the company. This allows us to abstract from the selection
implied by the endogenous choice of individuals whether to remain with the company or not (see
Cohen, 2003 and 2005).
The company studied was the ﬁrst company in the Israeli market that marketed insurance
to customers directly rather than through insurance agents. By the end of the studied period,
the company sold about seven percent of the automobile insurance policies issued in Israel. Direct
insurers operate in many countries including the US and appear to have a signiﬁcant cost advantage
(Cummins and Van Derhei, 1979). The studied company estimated that selling insurance directly
results in a cost advantage of roughly 25% of the administrative costs involved in marketing and
handling policies. Despite their cost advantage, direct insurers generally have had diﬃculty in
making inroads beyond a part of the market (D’Arcy and Doherty, 1990). This is so because their
product involves the “disamenity” of not having an agent to work with and turn to. The costs
of this disamenity appear to be substantial for a large fraction of potential buyers of insurance.
Consequently, only a subset of the insurance buyers are open to considering buying insurance
21For example, one may speculate that over conﬁdence is more of an issue in auto insurance than it is in life
insurance.
7directly and thus constitute potential customers of direct insurers. This aspect of the company
clearly makes the results of the paper applicable only to those consumers who are willing to buy
direct insurance; Section 5 discusses this selection in more detail.
While the paper’s primary focus is on the “demand side” of the market, namely on the deductible
choices, it is important to think about the “supply side” of the market (pricing), as this will be
relevant for any counterfactual exercise as well as for understanding the viability of the outside
option (which we do not observe). In this context, one should note that, for the most part,
the company had substantial market power over its pool of customers. This makes monopolistic
screening models apply more naturally than competitive models of insurance (e.g. Rothschild and
Stiglitz, 1976). In particular, during the ﬁrst two years of the company’s operations, the prices
it oﬀered were considerably lower, by roughly 20%, than those oﬀered by other, “conventional”
insurers. In the company’s third year of operation (December 1996 to March 1998) it faced more
competitive conditions. During this year, the established companies, trying to ﬁght oﬀ the new
entrant, lowered the premia for policies with regular deductibles to the levels oﬀered by the company.
In the remaining period included in the data, the established companies raised their prices back to
previous levels, leaving the company again with a substantial price advantage.22
For each policy, our data set includes all the information that the insurer had about the char-
acteristics of the policyholder: the policyholder’s demographic characteristics, the policyholder’s
vehicle characteristics, and the policyholder’s driving experience characteristics. The appendix pro-
vides a list of the variables with precise deﬁnitions, and Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. In
addition, our data set includes the individual-speciﬁc menu of four deductible-premium combina-
tions that the individual was oﬀered (see later), the individual’s choice from this menu, and the
realization of risks covered by the policy: the length of the period over which it was in eﬀect, the
number of claims submitted by the policyholder, and the amounts of the submitted claims that
the insurer paid or was expected to pay.23 Finally, we use the zip codes of the policyholders’ home
addresses to augment the data with proxies for additional individual characteristics based on the
Israeli 1995 census.24 In particular, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) associates each
census respondent with a unique “statistical area” (census tract), each including between 1,000
and 10,000 (relatively homogeneous) residents. We matched these census tracts with zip codes
based on street addresses, and constructed zip code level variables. These constructed variables
are available for more than 80% of the policyholders. The most important such variable is that of
(gross) monthly income, which is based on self-reported income by census respondents augmented
(by the CBS) with social security data.
22During this last period, two other companies oﬀering insurance directly were established. Due to ﬁrst-mover
advantage (as viewed by the company’s management), which helped the company maintain strong position in the
market, these two new companies did not aﬀect much pricing policies until the end of our observation period. Right
in the end of this period the studied company acquired one of those entrants.
23Throughout the analysis, we make the assumption that the main policyholder is the individual who makes the
deductible choice. Clearly, to the extent that this is not always the case, the results should be interpreted accordingly.
24The company has the addresses on record for billing purposes. Although, in principle, the company could have
used these data for pricing, they do not do so.
8The policies oﬀered by the insurer (as are all policies oﬀered in the Israeli automobile insur-
ance market) are one-period policies with no commitment on the part of either the insurer or the
policyholder.25 The auto-insurance policy we analyze in this paper resembles the US version of
“comprehensive” insurance, but is not exactly the same. It is not mandatory, but it is believed
to be held by a large fraction of Israeli car owners (above 70%, according to the company’s exec-
utives; we are not aware of any data about this). The policy does not cover death or injuries to
the policyholder or to third parties, which are insured through a separate, mandatory policy. It is
worth noting that the deductible choice is irrelevant for certain types of damages covered by the
policy. Insurance policies for radio, windshield, replacement car, and towing services are structured
and priced separately. Auto theft, total-loss accidents, and not “at fault” accidents are covered by
the policy, but do not involve deductible payments. Accordingly, we record as a claim only those
claims that eventually resulted in deductible payments. These are the only claims relevant for the
deductible choice.
Throughout the paper, we use and report money amounts in current (nominal) New Israeli
Shekels (NIS) to avoid creating artiﬁcial variation in the data. Consequently, the following facts
may be useful for interpretation and comparison with other papers in the literature. The exchange
rate between NIS and US dollars monotonically increased from 3.01 in 1995 to 4.14 in 1999 (on
average, it was 3.52).26 Annual inﬂation was about eight percent on average, and cumulative
inﬂation over the observation period was 48%. We will account for these eﬀects, as well as other
general trends, by using year dummy variables throughout the analysis.
2.2 The Menu of Deductible-Premium Combinations
Denote by xi the vector of characteristics individual i reports to the insurance company, as described
above. After learning xi the insurer oﬀered individual i a menu of four contract choices. One
option, which was labeled “regular” by the company, oﬀered a “regular” deductible and a “regular”
premium. The term “regular” was used for this deductible level both because it was relatively
similar to the deductible levels oﬀered by other insurers and because most policyholders (about
80%, see Table 2A) chose it. The regular premium varied across individuals according to some
deterministic function (unknown to us), pit = ft(xi), which was quite stable over time. The premia
associated with the other options were computed by multiplying pit by three diﬀerent constants, as
d e s c r i b e di nt h eﬁrst row of the table below. Similarly, the regular deductible, dit, was converted to
three other oﬀered deductible levels using three other constants (see the table below). The regular
deductible level was directly linked to the regular premium level through dit =m i n {1
2pit,cap t}.
25There is a substantial literature that studies the optimal design of policies that commit customers to a multi-
period contract, or that include a one-sided commitment of the insurer to oﬀer the policyholder certain terms in
subsequent periods (Dionne and Lasserre, 1985; Cooper and Hayes, 1987; Dionne and Doherty, 1994; Hendel and
Lizzeri, 2003). Although such policies are observed in certain countries (Dionne and Vanasse, 1992), many insurance
markets, including the Israeli one we study, use only one-period no-commitment policies (Kunreuther and Pauly,
1985).
26PPP ﬁgures, which may be more relevant for comparison, were about 10% lower than the nominal exchange rates,
running from 2.60 in 1995 to 3.74 in 1999.
9Namely, for regular premia which were not too high, the level of the regular deductible was set at
50% of the (regular) premium. For higher regular premia, the regular deductible level was set at a
uniform cap that varied over time but not across individuals.
The Pricing Formula
“Low” “Regular” “High” “Very High”
Premium 1.06 · pit pit 0.875 · pit 0.8 · pit
Deductible 0.6 · dit dit 1.8 · dit 2.6 · dit
To understand the pricing formula, suppose that for a given individual the company’s formula
yielded a “regular” premium of 2,000 NIS. Suppose that the deductible cap was set at the time
at 1,500 NIS, so it was not binding for this particular individual. This implies that the “regular”
premium-deductible contract oﬀered to her was (2,000; 1,000). Consequently, the “low,” “high,”
and “very high” contracts were set at (2,120; 600), (1,750; 1,800), and (1,600; 2,600), respectively. A
diﬀerent individual who was quoted contract terms at the same time, but had characteristics which
yielded a higher “regular” premium of 4,000 NIS, had the uniform cap binding, and was quoted
the following premium-deductible combinations: {(4,000; 1,500), (4,240; 900), (3,500; 2,700), and
(3,200; 3,900)} for “regular,” “low,” “high,” and “very high,” respectively.
There are two main sources of what we view as exogenous variation, resulting from company’s
experimentation and discrete adjustments to inﬂation and competitive conditions. The ﬁrst source
of variation arises from variation in the multipliers used to construct the menu of contracts. While
the multipliers described above were ﬁxed across individuals and over time, there was a six month
period during the insurer’s ﬁrst year of operation (May 1995 to October 1995), in which the insurer
experimented with multipliers which were slightly modiﬁed. For individuals with low levels of
regular premia during the speciﬁed period, the regular deductible was set at 53% (instead of 50%)
of the regular premium, the low deductible was set at 33% (instead of 30%) of the regular premium,
and so on. This modiﬁed formula covers almost ten percent of the sample. The second source of
v a r i a t i o ni nt h em e n u so ﬀered arises from changes over time to the uniform cap, capt.T h e c a p
varied over time (in both directions, up and down) due to inﬂation, competitive conditions, and as
the company gained more experience. Figure 1 presents the way the uniform cap changed over our
observation period. The cap was binding for about a third of the policyholders in our data. One
should also note that a small change in the cap does not only aﬀect the menus oﬀered to those
potential customers who move from being above the cap to below the cap; the change aﬀects all
potential customers whose previous regular premia were higher than the cap, as all their menus
will stipulate higher levels of deductibles. Figure 2 plots the (unconditional) variation of menus in
the data. As can be seen, much of this variation is driven by the exogenous shifts in the uniform
deductible cap. The underlying assumption is that, conditional on observables, these sources of
variation primarily aﬀect the deductible choice of new customers, but they do not have a signiﬁcant
impact on the probability of purchasing insurance from the company. This assumption holds in the
data with respect to observables.
102.3 Descriptive Figures
The top part of Table 2A provides descriptive statistics for the deductible-premium menus oﬀered,
all of which calculated according to the formula described above. Only one percent of the poli-
cyholders chose the “high” or the “very high” deductible options. Therefore, for the rest of the
analysis we only focus on the choice between the two other options: “regular” (chosen by eighty
percent) and “low” (chosen by almost twenty percent). The small frequency of “high” or “very
high” choices provides important information about the lower ends of the risk and risk aversion dis-
tributions, but (for that same reason) makes the analysis sensitive to functional form. Given these
low frequencies, it is also unclear to us whether these options were frequently mentioned during the
insurance sale process, rendering their use somewhat inappropriate.27 We should emphasize that
focusing only on the low and regular deductible levels does not create any selection bias because we
do not omit the individuals who chose “high” or “very high” deductibles. For these individuals, we
assume that they chose a “regular” deductible. This assumption is consistent with the structural
model we develop in the next section: conditional on choosing “high” or “very high” deductibles,
the individual would almost always prefer the “regular” over the “low” deductible.28
The bottom part of Table 2A, as well as Table 2B, presents some statistics for the realizations
of the policies. We focus only on claim rates and not on the amounts of the claims. This is because
any amount above the higher deductible level is covered irrespective of the deductible choice, and
the vast majority of the claims ﬁt in this category (see Section 5). For all these claims, the gain
from choosing a low deductible is the same in the event of a claim; it is equal to the diﬀerence
between the two deductible levels, irrespective of the claim amount. Thus, the claim amount is
rarely relevant for the deductible choice decision (and, likewise, for the company’s pricing decision
we analyze in Section 4.3).
Averaging across all individuals, the annual claim rate was about twenty ﬁve percent. One can
clearly observe some initial evidence of adverse selection: on average, individuals who chose the low
deductible had higher claim rates (30.9%) than those who chose the regular deductible (23.2%).
Those who chose high and very high deductibles had even lower claim rates (12.8% and 13.3%,
respectively). It may be worth interpreting these ﬁgures in the context of the pricing formula
described above. A risk neutral individual will choose the low deductible if and only if her claim




dregular−dlow. When the deductible cap does not bind, which is the case
for about two thirds of the sample, this ratio is directly given by the pricing formula and is equal
to 30%. Thus, any individual with a claim rate higher than 30% will beneﬁt from buying the
additional coverage provided by a low deductible even without any risk aversion. The claim data
s u g g e s tt h a tt h eo ﬀered menu is cheaper than an actuarially fair contract for a non-negligible part
of the population. This observation is in sharp contrast to other types of insurance contracts, such
27Considering these options creates a sharp lower bound on risk aversion for the majority of the observations,
making the estimates much higher.
28This is always true for “very high” deductibles. For “high” deductibles, there is a small range of risk rates for
which this is not true. Given the estimated coeﬃcients, the probability of individuals falling within this region is less
than one percent.
11as appliance warranties, which are much more expensive than the actuarially fair price (Rabin and
Thaler, 2001).
3T h e E m p i r i c a l M o d e l
3.1 The Individual Decision Problem
Let wi be individual i’s wealth, (ph
i ,d h
i ) the insurance contract (premium and deductible, respec-
tively) with high deductible, (pl
i,d l
i) the insurance contract with low deductible, ti the duration of
the policy, and ui(w) individual i’s vNM utility function. We assume that the number of insurance
claims is drawn from a Poisson distribution, with claims coming at a known (to the individual)
rate of λi per unit of time (year). As already mentioned, we also assume that moral hazard does
n o tp l a ya ni m p o r t a n tr o l e ,i . e . t h a tλi is independent of the deductible choice and that, in the
event of an accident, the value of the claim is greater than dh
i with probability one. We discuss and
justify these assumptions in Section 5. For the rest of this section, i subscripts are suppressed for
convenience.
In the market we study, insurance policies are typically held for a full year, after which they can
be automatically renewed with no commitment by either the company or the individual. Moreover,
all auto-insurance policies sold in Israel can be canceled without prior notice by the policyholder,
with premium payments being linearly prorated. It turns out to be convenient to think of the
contract choice as a commitment for only a short amount of time, so both the premium and the
probability of an accident (coming from a Poisson distribution) are proportional to the length of the
time interval taken into account. This approach has several advantages. First, it helps to account
for early cancellations and truncated policies (those which expired after October 1999, the end
of our observation period), which together account for about thirty percent of the policies in our
data.29 Second, it makes the deductible choice independent of other longer-term uncertainties faced
by the individual, allowing us to focus on the static risk-taking behavior, avoiding its relationship
with inter-temporal substitution. Third, as will soon become clear, this formulation helps us to
obtain a simple framework for analysis, which is attractive both analytically and computationally.30
29As can be seen in Table 2A, 70% of the policies in our data are observed through their full duration (one year).
About 15% of the policies are truncated by the end of our observation period, and the remaining 15% are canceled
for various reasons, such as change in car ownership, total-loss accident, or a unilateral decision of the policyholder
to change insurance providers.
30This speciﬁcation ignores the option value associated with not canceling a policy. This is not very restrictive.
Since experience rating is small and menus do not change by much, this option value is likely to be close to zero. A
simple alternative is to assume that individuals behave as if they commit for a full year of coverage. In such case,
the model will be similar to the one we estimate, but will depend on the functional form of the vNM utility function,
and would generally require taking inﬁnite sums (over the potential realizations for the number of claims within the
year). In the special case of quadratic expected utility maximizers, who only care about the mean and variance of
the number of claims, this is easy to solve. The result is almost identical to the expression we subsequently derive in
equation (7).
12The expected utility that the individual obtains from the choice of a contract (p,d) is given by
v(p,d) ≡ (1 − λt)u(w − pt)+( λt)u(w − pt − d)=
= u(w − pt) − λt[u(w − pt) − u(w − pt − d)] (1)
We search for the individual who is indiﬀerent between the two choices she is oﬀered. This gives
us a lower (upper) bound on the level of risk aversion for individuals who choose the low (high)
deductible. Thus, we analyze the equation v(ph,d h)=v(pl,d l),i . e .
u(w−pht)−λt
h




u(w − plt) − u(w − plt − dl)
i
(2)
By taking limits with respect to t (and applying L’Hopital’s rule), we obtain
λ =l i m
t→0
µ
u(w − pht) − u(w − plt)










u(w − dl) − u(w − dh)
´
(4)
The last expression has a simple intuition. The right hand side is the expected gain (in utils) per
unit of time from choosing a low deductible. The left hand side is the cost of such a choice per unit
of time. For the individual to be indiﬀerent, the expected gains must equal the costs.
We can now continue in one of two ways. In our benchmark speciﬁcation, we try to avoid making
functional form restrictions on the vNM utility function. By assuming that the third derivative of
the vNM utility function is not too large, we can use a Taylor expansion for both terms on the
right hand side of equation (4), i.e. u(w − d) ≈ u(w) − du0(w)+d2
2 u00(w). This gives us
pl − ph
λ
u0(w) ≈ (dh − dl)u0(w) −
1
2
(dh − dl)(dh + dl)u00(w) (5)
Let ∆d ≡ dh − dl > 0, ∆p ≡ pl − ph > 0,a n dd ≡ 1
2(dh + dl) to get
∆p
λ∆d










where r is the coeﬃc i e n to fa b s o l u t er i s ka v e r s i o na tw e a l t hl e v e lw (recall, all notation is individual
speciﬁc). The equation above deﬁnes an indiﬀerence set in the space of risk and risk aversion, which
we will refer to by (r∗
i(λ),λ) and (λ∗
i(r),r) interchangeably. Note that both r∗
i(λ) and λ∗
i(r) have
a closed-form representation, a property which will be computationally attractive for estimation.31
31For example, estimating the CARA version of the model, for which r
∗
i (λ) does not have a closed-form represen-
tation, takes almost ten times longer.
13Note also that both terms are individual speciﬁc, as they depend on the deductible-choice menu,
which varies across individuals.
Alternatively, we can impose a particular functional form on the vNM utility function. Two
standard forms are those that exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) or constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA). In the CARA case, we can substitute u(w)=−exp(−rw) into equation (4)





as the equation which deﬁnes the indiﬀerence set. Now, unlike before, there is no closed-form
representation for r∗
i(λ). Still, the set does not depend on wealth, which is a direct implication of
the CARA property. Finally, in the CRRA case, we can substitute u(w)=w1−γ into equation (4)
and rearrange to obtain
λ =
(1 − γ)w−γ∆p
(w − dl)1−γ − (w − dh)1−γ (9)
as the equation which deﬁnes the indiﬀerence set. To use this expression, we will also need to
make assumptions about wealth, which we do not observe. The CARA and CRRA examples, and
many other vNM utility functions, introduce a positive third derivative of u(w), which provides
an additional (“precautionary”) incentive to insure. Therefore, in comparison to our benchmark
speciﬁcation which assumes a small, negligible third derivative, these speciﬁcations would lead to
a greater incentive to choose a low deductible. In other words, in comparison to the benchmark
speciﬁcation and given λ we can use a lower level of absolute risk aversion to rationalize the low
deductible choice. Thus, these speciﬁcations will generally lead to lower estimates of the coeﬃcient
of risk aversion.
For the rest of the paper, we regard each individual as associated with two-dimensional type
parameters (ri,λ i), i.e. with her level of (absolute) risk aversion and with her level of risk. An




i)} will choose the low
deductible if and only if ri >r ∗
i(λi). See Figure 3 for a graphical illustration.
3.2 The Benchmark Statistical Model
Our objective is to estimate the joint distribution of (λi,r i) — the claim rate and coeﬃcient of
absolute risk aversion — in our population of policyholders, conditional on observables xi.T h e
benchmark formulation will impose that (λi,r i) follows a bivariate Lognormal distribution.32 Thus,
we can write the model as
lnλi = x0
iβ + εi (10)
lnri = x0
iγ + υi (11)
32As will become clear later, the normality assumption provides a closed-form conditional distribution, allowing us to
use only univariate (rather than bivariate) draws in the estimation procedure, signiﬁcantly reducing the computational
burden. There is hardly any literature on the distribution of risk preferences for us to draw from. The only evidence
we are aware of is the experimental results presented by Andersen et al. (2004). These results show a skewed


















The model becomes more complicated because neither λi nor ri is directly observed. Thus, they
are treated as latent variables, which, loosely speaking, can be thought of as random eﬀects. We
only observe two variables (the claims and the deductible choice) which are related to these two
unobserved components. Thus, to complete our empirical model we have to specify the relationship
between the observed variables and the latent ones. This is done by making two structural assump-
tions that were already mentioned. First, we assume that the number of claims is a realization
from a Poisson distribution, namely
claimsi ∼ Poisson(λiti) (13)
where ti is the observed duration of the policy. Second, we assume that individuals follow the
theoretical model described in the previous section when they make the deductible choice. The
model implies that individual i chooses low deductible (choicei =1 )i fa n do n l yi fri >r ∗
i(λi),
where r∗
i(·), deﬁned in equation (7), has an individual-speciﬁc subscript because each individual
faces a diﬀerent deductible-premium menu. Thus, the empirical model for deductible choice is given
by










The choice equation is a nonlinear function of risk aversion and claim rate, and there is important
heterogeneity in the population in both dimensions. The equation makes clear why the deductible
choice is more than just a Probit regression. Both unobserved risk aversion (υi) and claim rate
(εi, through λi) enter the right hand side, thereby forcing us to integrate over the two-dimensional
region in which the model predicts a choice of a low deductible.
A natural way to proceed is to estimate the model by Maximum Likelihood, where the likelihood
of the data as a function of the parameters can be written by integrating out the latent variables,
namely
L(claimsi,choice i|θ)=P r ( claimsi,choice i|λi,r i)Pr(λi,r i|θ) (15)


















































































15where f(λ,r|θ) is the probability density function of the bivariate Lognormal distribution with
parameters θ.
While formulating the empirical model using likelihood may help thinking about the data gener-
ating process, using Maximum Likelihood (or GMM) for estimation is computationally cumbersome.
This is because in each iteration it requires evaluating a separate integral for each individual in the
data. In contrast, Gibbs sampling is quite attractive in such a case. Using data augmentation of
latent variables (Tanner and Wong, 1987), according to which we simulate (λi,r i) and later treat
those simulations as if they are part of the data, one can avoid evaluating the complex integrals by
just sampling from truncated Normal distributions, which is much less computationally demanding
(e.g. Devroye, 1986). This feature, combined with the idea of a “sliced sampler” (Damien et al.,
1999) to sample from an unfamiliar posterior distribution, makes the use of a Gibbs sampler quite
eﬃcient for our purposes. Finally, the normality assumption implies that lnλi|ri (and, similarly,
lnri|λi) follows a (conditional) Normal distribution, allowing us to restrict attention to univariate
draws, further reducing the computational burden.
Appendix A provides all the technical details of our Gibbs sampler, including the conditional
distributions and the (ﬂat) prior distributions we use. The basic intuition is that conditional on
observing (λi,r i) for each individual we have a simple linear regression model with two equations.
T h et r i c k yp a r ti st og e n e r a t ed r a w sf o r(λi,r i). We do this iteratively. Conditional on λi,t h e
posterior distribution for lnri follows a truncated Normal distribution, where the truncation point
depends on the menu individual i faces, and its direction (from above or below) depends on in-
dividual i’s deductible choice. This is similar to a simple Probit, except for one minor diﬀerence.
In a standard Probit the level of the latent variable is typically not identiﬁed, so the variance of
the normally-distributed error term is normalized to one. In contrast, in our setting the structural
assumptions provide us with an alternative normalization, thus identifying the variance of the error
term. The ﬁnal step is to sample from the posterior distribution of λi conditional on ri.T h i s
is more complicated as we have both truncation which arises from adverse selection (just as we
do when sampling for ri) as well as the claim information, which provides additional information
about the posterior of λi. Thus, the posterior for λi takes an unfamiliar form. To sample from this
distribution we use a “sliced sampler,” a statistical method proposed by Damien et al. (1999).
We use 100,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler. It seems to converge to the stationary distribu-
tion after about 5,000 iterations. Therefore, we drop the ﬁrst 10,000 draws and use the last 90,000
draws of each variable to report our results. Note that each iteration involves generating separate
draws of (λi,r i) for each of the 105,800 individuals. 100,000 iterations of the whole algorithm
(coded in Matlab) take about 60 hours on a Dell precision 530 workstation.
3.3 Intuition for Identiﬁcation
The goal of this section is to provide intuition for the variation in the data that identiﬁes the
model, and to highlight the assumptions that are essential for identiﬁcation vis-a-vis those that are
only made for computational convenience (making them, in principle, testable). We discuss the
16identiﬁcation conditional on covariates, so one can think of the discussion as being applied for a set
of individuals who are identical in their observable variables (beyond deductible choices and claims).
While a formal identiﬁcation proof is outside the scope of this paper, we numerically veriﬁed that
the estimated model is indeed (parametrically) identiﬁed by simulating data and obtaining back
the pre-set parameters for various parameterizations and diﬀerent initial values.
The main diﬃculty in identifying the model arises from the gap between the risk type (the λi’s
i no u rm o d e l ) ,w h i c hi su s e db yi n d i v i d u a l sw h e nc h o o sing a deductible, and the realization of risk,
which is the number of claims we observe. This identiﬁcation problem is similar to the one faced
by Cardon and Hendel (2001). Cardon and Hendel use the variation in coverage choice (analogous
to our choice of deductible) to identify the variation in health-status signals (analogous to our risk-
types) from the variation in health expenditure (analogous to our number of claims). They can
rely on the coverage choice to identify this because they assume a particular (i.i.d logit) form of
heterogeneity in preferences. We take a diﬀerent approach, as our main goal is to estimate (rather
than assume) the distribution of risk preferences. We identify between the variation in risk types
and in risk realizations using our distributional assumptions. This allows us to use the coverage
(deductible) choice as an additional layer of information, which identiﬁes unobserved heterogeneity
in risk aversion.
Thus, the key assumption in the identiﬁcation of the model is that the distribution of risk types
can be uniquely backed out from the claim data alone. Any distributional assumption that satisﬁes
this property would be suﬃcient to identify the distribution of risk aversion. As is customary in the
analysis of count processes such as ours, we make a particular parametric assumption, assuming
that claims are generated by a Lognormal mixture of Poisson distributions. Using a mixture has
two advantages. First, it enables us to account for adverse selection through variation in risk types.
Second, it allows the model to better ﬁt the fatter tails of the claim distribution compared to the
tails generated by a simple Poisson process.33
Once we make the distributional assumption that we can estimate the distribution of risk
types only from claim data, the marginal distribution of risk aversion (and its relationship to
the distribution of risk types) can be, in principle, nonparametrically identiﬁed. This is due to
the exogenous variation in the oﬀered menus, which is discussed in Section 2. As mentioned
earlier, variation in the deductible cap over time and some experimentation with the pricing policy
provide variation in the menu faced by two identical (on observables) individuals, who purchased
insurance from the company at diﬀerent times. Diﬀerent menus of deductible-premium options
lead to diﬀerent indiﬀerence sets (similar to the one depicted in Figure 3), which often cross each
other and nonparametrically identify the distribution of risk aversion and the correlation structure,
at least within the region in which the indiﬀerence sets vary. At the tails of the distribution, as is
typically the case, there is no data, so we have to rely on parametric assumptions or to use bounds.
33An alternative is a Negative Binomial distribution, which generalizes Poisson to allow for overdispersion and is
often used to model count processes. In general, it will allow more overdispresion to be explained by the distribution
rather than by heterogeneity, thereby giving less room for possible adverse selection. This is likely to increase the
estimated heterogeneity (and therefore the mean) of estimated risk aversion compared to our benchmark model.
17The assumption of Lognormality we use throughout the paper is only made for computational
convenience.
Let us now provide simple intuition for the (parametric) identiﬁcation mechanism. To keep the
intuition simple, let us take the bivariate Lognormal distribution as given and, contrary to the data,
assume that all identical individuals face an identical menu of deductible-premium combinations.
Suppose also that the maximum number of claims observed for each individual is two, and that all
individuals are observed for exactly one year.34 In such a case, the data can be summarized by ﬁve
numbers. Let α0, α1,a n dα2 =1− α1 − α0 be the fraction of individuals with zero, one, and two
claims, respectively. Let ϕ0, ϕ1,a n dϕ2 be the proportion of individuals who chose low deductible
within each “claim group.” Given our distributional assumption about the data generating process
of the claim distribution, we can use α0 and α1 to uniquely identify the mean and variance of
the Lognormal distribution of risk types. Given this distribution, we can (implicitly) construct a
posterior distribution of risk types for each claim group, namely F(λ|r,claims = c), and integrate
over it when predicting the deductible choice. This will provide us with three additional moments,
each of the form
E(ϕc)=
RR
Pr(choice =1 |r,λ)dF(λ|r,claims = c)dF(r) (17)
for c =0 ,1,2. These moments will then uniquely identify the three remaining parameters of the
model, namely the mean and variance of the risk aversion distribution, as well as the correlation
coeﬃcient.
Let us ﬁnally provide more economic content to the above identiﬁcation argument. Following
the same example and conditional on the (already identiﬁed) distribution of risk types and the cor-
responding posteriors, one can think about the deductible choice data as providing a line described
by the various ϕc’s. The absolute level of the line identiﬁes the average level of risk aversion. In the
absence of correlation between risk and risk aversion, the slope of the line identiﬁes the variance in
risk aversion. With no correlation, the slope should always be positive (due to adverse selection),
b u tt h el i n ew i l lb eﬂatter as the variance of risk aversion is higher, as more of the deductible
choice will be attributed to variation in risk aversion, which is uncorrelated with claims. Finally,
the correlation parameter can be thought of as identiﬁe db yt h ec u r v a t u r eo ft h el i n e .T h em o r e
convex (concave) the line is, the more positive (negative) the correlation parameter. For example,
if ϕ0 =0 .5, ϕ1 =0 .51,a n dϕ2 =0 .99 it is very likely that the variance of risk aversion is high
(explaining why ϕ0 and ϕ1 are so close) and the correlation between risk and risk aversion is highly
positive (explaining why ϕ2 is not also close to ϕ1). In contrast, if ϕ0 >ϕ 1 it must mean that the
correlation between risk and risk aversion is negative, which is the only way the original positive
correlation induced by adverse selection can be oﬀset. This intuition also clariﬁes that identiﬁcation
relies on observations with multiple claims (or diﬀerent policy durations).
34In the data we have, of course, more degrees of freedom. We observe up to ﬁve claims per individual, we observe
continuous variation in the policy durations, and we exploit distributional restrictions across individual with diﬀerent
observables.
18To summarize, one should note that the extent of the positive (or negative) correlation is
strongly related to the structural model for deductible choice described earlier. The data (see
Table 2B) provide direct correlation between deductible choice and risk (claims). The structural
assumptions allow us to explain how much of this correlation can be attributed to adverse selection.
The remaining correlation is therefore attributed to correlation in the underlying distribution of
r i s ka n dr i s ka v e r s i o n .
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Descriptive Analysis
Cohen (2005) provides “reduced form” evidence for the existence of adverse selection in our data
using a version of the bivariate Probit test suggested by Chiappori and Salanie (2000). Table
3 and Table 4A repeat some of these regressions and provide some reduced-form analysis of the
relationship between the observables and our two left-hand side variables, the number of claims
and the deductible choice. Table 3 reports the estimates from a Poisson regression of the number
of claims on the covariates. This regression is closely related to the risk equation we estimate in
our benchmark model. It shows that older people, women, and people with academic education are
less likely to have an accident. Bigger, more expensive, older, and non-commercial cars are more
likely to be involved in an accident. Driving experience and variables associated with less intense
use of the car reduce accident rates. As could be imagined, claim propensity is highly correlated
over time: past claims are strong predictor of future claims. Young drivers are about 50% more
likely to be involved in an accident, with young men signiﬁcantly more than young women. Finally,
as indicated by the trend in the estimated year dummies, the accident rate signiﬁcantly declined
over time. Part of this decline is likely due to the decline in accident rates in Israel in general (in
particular, traﬃc fatalities and counts of traﬃc accidents in Israel fell by 11% and 18% during 1998
and 1999, respectively). This decline might also be partly due to the better selection of individuals
the company obtained over time, as it gained more experience; over time, the company might have
improved its ability to identify and price out the more risky potential customers.
Table 4 presents estimates from simple Probit regressions in which the dependent variable is
equal to 1 if the policy holder chose a low deductible, and is equal to zero otherwise. In general,
the coeﬃcients should proxy for risk attitudes. More risk averse individuals should be more likely
to choose low deductibles. This is not precise, however, as the price of risk varied with demo-
graphics. Thus, it may be that a certain coeﬃcient is positive not because of its association with
higher risk aversion, but because it is associated with risk, which is under-priced by the company.
Other columns of Table 4A control for risk and prices, and some of the coeﬃcients indeed change.
Ultimately, these interpretation problems are the reason one needs a more structural model, such
as the one we estimate below. With this qualiﬁcation in mind, Table 4A suggests that older people
are less risk averse, while women, owners of expensive cars, and individuals who had recent claims
are more risk averse. In this regression we again observe a strong trend over time. Fewer and fewer
19policy holders chose the low deductible as time went by. One reason for this trend, according to the
company executives, is that over time the company’s sales persons were directed to mainly focus
on the “default,” regular deductible-premium option.35
Table 4C presents a structural interpretation of the simple Probit regression. This can be
thought of as a restriction of the benchmark model, which does not allow unobserved heterogeneity
in risk exposure. In such a case consumers have no private information about their risk type, and
the risk type can thus be estimated directly from the data. The structure of the model dictates the
functional form in which the predicted risk and the deductible-premium combinations enter into
the deductible choice. Under the Lognormality assumption for the risk aversion distribution, this
just means that the additional variable is log(
∆pi/(b λ(Xi)∆di)−1
di ). The structural assumptions imply
that the coeﬃcient on this variable is −1, thus freeing up the normalization of the Probit error
term. While the signs of the estimated coeﬃcients are similar in Table 4C and in the benchmark
model presented below, the restricted version of the model suggests much higher eﬀects, and much
higher signiﬁcance levels, for all coeﬃcients. It also suggests a signiﬁcantly higher unobserved
heterogeneity in risk aversion. It is clear that the full estimation of the benchmark model rejects
this restriction on the model.
Finally, to get a sense of the levels of absolute risk aversion implied by the data, one could use a
simple back-of-the-envelope exercise. We compute unconditional averages of ∆p, ∆d, λ, dh, dl,a n d
d (see Table 2A),36 and substitute these values in equation (7). The implied coeﬃcient of absolute
risk aversion from this exercise is 2.9∗10−4 NIS−1.O n ec a na l s oi m p l i c i t l ys o l v ef o rt h ec o e ﬃcient
of risk aversion using the CARA speciﬁcation in equation (8), which gives a slightly lower value of
2.5∗10−4. Ignoring nonlinearities, we can go on and think of this level as the average cutoﬀ point,
implying that about 18% of our policy holders have a coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion exceeding
it. To convert to US dollar amounts, one needs to multiply these ﬁgures by the average exchange
rate (3.52), resulting in an average indiﬀerence point of 1.02∗10−3 (8.8∗10−4 in the CARA case).
This ﬁgure can be compared to two other similar ﬁgures reported in the literature. Metrick (1995)
imposes the CARA utility function, and estimates the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion (for a
representative player in “Jeopardy!”) to be 6.6∗10−5, which is 13 to 15 times lower than the ﬁgures
above. Gertner (1993) ﬁnds a lower bound of the CARA coeﬃcient (for a representative player in
“Card Sharks”) to be 3.1∗10−4, which is 3-4 times lower than the ﬁgures above. One can continue
with back of the envelope exercises, and multiply our ﬁgure of absolute risk aversion by the average
disposable annual income, which was about 50,000 NIS at the time, to obtain a measure for the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. This implies that the 82nd percentile in the distribution of
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is about 13-15. This, of course, also ignores the fact that
35One should note that such biased marketing eﬀorts will bias consumers against choosing the low deductible, thus
making them look less risk averse. This would make our estimate a lower bound on the true level of risk aversion. If
only sophisticated consumers could see beyond the marketing eﬀort, and this sophistication is related to observables
(e.g. education), the coeﬃcients on such observables would be biased upwards. Such biases can be evaluated by
running the model on each year separately.
36The unconditional λ is computed by maximum likelihood, using the data on claims and observed durations of
the policies.
20absolute risk aversion and wealth are likely to be correlated. All these exercises are, in general,
rather crude and imprecise, and do not account for nonlinearities, heterogeneity, and endogeneity.
This is exactly why we need the more structural model we develop is this paper.
4.2 Estimation Results
Risk Aversion and Individual Characteristics Table 5 presents the results from the bench-
mark model. The risk aversion coeﬃcients in the two right columns of Table 5 are, in our view,
one of the main contributions of the paper. They show how the level of absolute risk aversion is
related to the demographic characteristics of individuals. As the dependent variable is in natural
logarithm, coeﬃcients on dummy variables can be directly interpreted as approximate percentage
changes. Table 6 repeats the same exercise for a CARA speciﬁcation.
Our results indicate that women are more risk averse than men. In particular, women have
ac o e ﬃcient of absolute risk aversion about 16% greater than that of men. These results are
consistent with those of Donkers et al. (2001) and Hartog et al. (2002). The eﬀect of age and
marital status is not signiﬁcant.37 One exception is divorced individuals who appear to be less risk
averse, which seems reasonable. A somewhat surprising result of our analysis is that variables which
are likely to be correlated with income or wealth seem to have a positive coeﬃcient, indicating that
wealthier people have a higher level of absolute risk aversion. This is true for individuals with post
high school education, as well as for owners of more expensive cars. In unreported regressions,
we also ﬁnd that the elasticity of absolute risk aversion with respect to gross monthly income,
as measured by average income among households living in the same zip code, is positive 0.35,
and is highly signiﬁcant. At ﬁrst glance — but only at ﬁrst glance — these results may appear to
be inconsistent with the widely held belief that absolute risk aversion declines with wealth. It is
important, however, to distinguish between two questions: (i) whether, for a given individual, the
vNM utility function exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion; and (ii) how risk preferences vary
across individuals. Our results do not at all speak to the ﬁrst question and should not be thought
of as a test of the decreasing absolute risk aversion property. This property can only be tested by
observing the same individual making multiple choices at diﬀerent wealth levels. Rather, our results
are more closely related to the second question, i.e. to a comparison among individuals. The results
indicate that individuals with greater wealth have utility functions that involve a greater degree of
risk aversion. It might be that risk aversion, or individual characteristics that are correlated with
it, lead individuals to save more, to obtain more education, or to take other actions that lead to
greater wealth.
One may be tempted to interpret the positive wealth eﬀects we ﬁnd above as an indirect indi-
cation for credit constraints. Wealthier individuals are less credit constrained, and therefore can
aﬀord to purchase more insurance. We do not share this interpretation for two reasons. First,
this is an unconditional interpretation. Note, however, that the insurance company observes these
proxies for wealth and conditions on them when setting prices. Since the willingness to pay for
37While age has signiﬁcant eﬀects in both Donkers et al. (2001) and Hartog et al. (2002), it takes diﬀerent signs.
21insurance is likely to be correlated with the willingness to pay for the additional insurance provided
by the low deductible option, premia already reﬂect this variation. We condition on the level of
the premium, and therefore the wealth coeﬃcients we ﬁnd are conditional on premia, rather than
unconditional. Second, one should note that paying less ex-ante implies paying more ex-post, so
applying the credit constraint argument only for the ex-ante payment but not for the probabilistic
ex-post deductible payments has no theoretical foundation. Essentially, the setup of the model
links the ex-ante decisions with the ex-post losses, which are both driven by the curvature of the
vNM utility function. This is exactly how we interpret our ﬁndings.
Let us make several additional observations. First, while the owners of more expensive cars
appear to have both higher risk exposure and higher levels of risk aversion, owners of bigger cars
have higher risk exposure but lower levels of risk aversion. This should indicate that the structure
of the model itself does not necessarily constrain the relationship between the coeﬃcients in the two
equations. Rather, it is the data that speak up. Second, it is interesting to note that individuals
who are classiﬁed by the insurer as “good drivers” indeed have lower risk, but also appear to have
lower risk aversion. This result is somewhat similar to the positive correlation between unobserved
risk and unobserved risk aversion, which we report below. We discuss its interpretation later.
Third, the results suggest that policyholders who tend to use the car for business are less risk
averse. This ﬁnding might be due to the fact that the uninsured costs of accidents occurring to
such policyholders might be borne by their employer or might be tax deductible. We ﬁnd that
policyholders who reported three full years of past claim history are more risk averse, but are not
diﬀerent in their risk exposure. The attitude that leads such policyholders to comply with the
request to (voluntarily) report full three years of claim history is apparently, and not surprisingly,
correlated with higher levels of risk aversion. In contrast, while past claims indicate high risk,
they have no signiﬁcant relationship with risk aversion. Finally, one should note the strong trend
towards lower levels of risk aversion over time. This is a replication of the Probit results reported
and discussed at the end of the preceding section.
The Level of Risk Aversion Our results enable us to estimate the levels of absolute risk aversion
in the population we study. Since we use Gibbs sampler and augment the latent coeﬃcients of
absolute risk aversion, we can directly obtain the posterior distribution ofv a r i o u sm o m e n t so ft h e
distribution. Note that these estimates cannot be read directly from the regression results in Table
5. Since the dependent variable is in natural logarithm, one needs to account for the distribution
of the observables when computing moments of the distribution of ri.I n T a b l e 7 w e r e p o r t t h e
point estimates of the (unconditional) mean and median from this distribution. The implied risk
aversion of the mean individual is 0.0016, which is four times greater than the back-of-the-envelope
calculation presented in the end of the previous section. As we assume a Lognormal distribution
and estimate a relatively high coeﬃcient of σr, the estimates also imply signiﬁcantly lower estimates
for the median level of risk aversion.
In Table 7 we also present two ways to interpret the estimates, as well as comparisons to a CARA
speciﬁcation, to an incomplete-information speciﬁcation (see later), and to other comparable ﬁgures
22in the literature (Gertner, 1993; Metrick, 1995; Holt and Laury, 2002). The estimate suggests that
an average quadratic utility maximizer38 will be indiﬀerent about participating in a lottery in
which she gains 100 dollars with probability 0.5 and loses 61.3 dollars with probability 0.5.A
CARA speciﬁcation suggests much lower value for average risk aversion, but one that is still higher
than other results in the literature. The reason that a CARA speciﬁcation aﬀects the levels so
much is because of its relatively high third derivative. This speciﬁcation introduces an additional
(precautionary) incentive to choose low deductibles, thus not requiring very high levels of the
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion to explain the observed deductible choices. Finally, Table 7
shows that the incomplete information model does not change the main conclusions.
Let us brieﬂy discuss the relevance of the comparison to Gertner (1993) and Metrick (1995).
There are two ways in which one can reconcile the diﬀerences between the estimates. First, as
already discussed, both of these papers measure risk aversion for television show participants; these
are highly selected groups in a rather “risk-friendly” environment.39 Second, the magnitudes of the
stakes are higher. Their television show participants make bets over at least several thousands of
dollars, while our average individual risks much lower stakes, at the range of one hundred dollars.
Thus, the diﬀerence in the results may be due to the issues raised in Rabin (2000) regarding the
comparability of behavior across diﬀerent contexts and bet sizes. People may behave diﬀerently,
i.e. exhibit diﬀerent levels of absolute risk aversion, for diﬀerent sizes of bets. In fact, in a similar
fashion to Rabin’s (2000) exercise, if we apply our estimates for ﬁfty-ﬁf t yb e t so fm u c hb i g g e rs i z e ,
the implied certainty equivalence is extremely low. As the goal in this paper is to estimate risk
attitudes of insurees in the context of the decisions they have to make, we do not pursue this
extrapolation exercise any further, and feel comfortable to report them as consistent estimates for
bets at the one hundred dollar range.
Ad i ﬀerent way to quantify our estimate is by reporting it in relative terms. Following the
literature (e.g. Gertner, 1993), we do so by multiplying the estimated coeﬃcient of absolute risk
aversion by the average annual income in Israel during the observation period. Under the assump-
tion that annual income is a good proxy for the relevant wealth at the time of decision making,
this product would be a proxy for the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. As discussed in the
introduction, there are many good reasons to question such an exercise on structural grounds. We
provide it mainly as a way to compare our estimates to those found in the literature. As Table 7
indicates, our benchmark speciﬁcation results in an implied coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of
about 82. A CARA speciﬁcation results in a lower coeﬃcient of 9.8.B o t ho ft h e s eﬁgures, however,
are signiﬁcantly higher than the widely used estimate of a low single-digit coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion.
Finally, we should note that, as reported in Table 7, our estimates for the average individual are
much higher than those for the median individual. Although the mean is always greater than the
38For such an individual the second-order Taylor expansion we use in Section 3.1 is exact.
39We suspect that individuals who participate in television game shows are more adventuresome than the general
population. Moreover, knowing that the audience might wish to see them keep betting is likely to further encourage
participants to take risks.
23median under the Lognormal distribution, the big diﬀerence we ﬁnd is not imposed. In principle,
we could have obtained a high level of risk aversion with less heterogeneity, thereby leading to a
smaller diﬀerence between the mean and the median (the estimated distribution of risk types is
a ne x a m p l e ) .T h eh i g h l ys k e w e de s t i m a t e dd i s t r i b u t i o no fr i s ka v e r s i o nm a yr e ﬂect the fact that,
indeed, most people are almost risk neutral with respect to bets of these relatively small sizes, but
a small fraction of individuals is extremely risk averse.
The Risk Regression The risk coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 5 (and, similarly,
Table 6) provide information on the relationship between observables and exposure to risk. They
indicate that the likelihood of an accident is smaller for people with academic education. Bigger,
more expensive, and non-commercial cars are more likely to be involved in an accident. Driving
experience reduces accident rates, as do measures of less intense use of the car. Claim propensity
is highly correlated over time. The voluntary report of past claims is a strong predictor of future
claims. Young drivers are more likely to be involved in an accident, with young men signiﬁcantly
more so than young women.
It is worth noting that the risk regression in Table 5 produces results that are similar to those
of the simpler Poisson regression reported in Table 3. Although some of the coeﬃcients lose sig-
niﬁcance, the magnitude of most coeﬃcients is quite similar to those presented in Table 3. The
similarity between these two sets of results is to be expected, as there is very little new information
that the structural model incorporates into the risk regression. As discussed in the previous section,
the risk regression is identiﬁed only from the data on claims, so incorporating the information on
deductible choice does not qualitatively change the conceptual identiﬁcation strategy. If the results
were not similar, this would have been an indication for a misspeciﬁcation of the model. The slight
diﬀerences between the risk regressions in Table 3 and Table 5 are mainly driven by the structural
assumptions. First, the benchmark model estimates a Normal mixture of Poisson models, rather
than a single Poisson model. By incorporating the fatter tails of the claim distribution, it slightly
changes the results, increases the standard errors, and decreases the average predicted claim rate.
Second, the information on deductible choice slightly helps us in obtaining more precise estimates
through the correlation structure between the error terms in the two equations.
The Relationship between Unobserved Risk and Unobserved Risk Aversion Table 5
allows us to make observations about the relationship between risk and risk aversion. First, our
results enable us to assess the relative importance of unobserved heterogeneity of both dimensions.
In the population we study, the unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion (σr) is much greater
than the unobserved heterogeneity in risk (σλ). This is true both in absolute terms and after
normalizing by the corresponding mean level. This m a yi n d i c a t et h a ts e l e c t i o no nr i s ka v e r s i o ni s
more important in our data than selection on risk, i.e. adverse selection. One should note, however,
that the right metric to use for such statements is not entirely clear, as one should project these
estimated variances onto the same scale of, say, willingness to pay or proﬁts. Therefore, we relegate
the discussion of this issue to Section 4.3.
24Furthermore, Table 5 also indicates a strong and signiﬁcant positive correlation of 0.86 between
unobserved risk aversion and unobserved risk. This result might be viewed as surprising because
it is natural to think that risk aversion with respect to ﬁnancial decisions is likely to be associated
with a greater tendency to take precautions, and therefore with lower risk. Indeed, a recent paper
by Finkelstein and McGarry (2003) supports such intuition by documenting a negative correlation
between risk aversion and risk in the market for long term care insurance.40 Our market, however,
might be special in ways that could produce a positive correlation. First, in contrast to most
insurance markets where a poliycholder’s risk depends on the policyholder’s precautions but not on
the precautions of others, accident risk in the auto insurance market is a result of an interaction
between one’s driving habits and those of other drivers. In the auto insurance market, driving
too slow or too carefully may actually expose a policyholder to a greater risk. An indication that
something like this may be going on is the negative coeﬃcient on the “good driver” variable in the
risk aversion regression of Table 5.
Second, the correlation coeﬃcient may be highly sensitive to the particular way we measure
risk and risk aversion. There are many unobserved omitted factors that are likely to be related to
both dimensions. For example, the extent to which individuals drive more carefully may not be
the primary determinant of the risk posed by an individual policyholder. The intensity of vehicle
use, for example, might be a more important determinant of risk. If individuals who are more risk
averse also drive more miles per year, a positive correlation between risk and risk aversion could
emerge. Thus, our results caution against assuming that risk and risk aversion are always negatively
correlated. Whether this is the case may depend on the characteristics of the particular market
one studies, and on the particular measure for risk. Indeed, one can use estimated annual mileage
to control for one omitted variable that may potentially work to produce a positive correlation
between risk aversion and risk. Despite its partial coverage in the data and being considered (by
the company) as unreliable,41 controlling for annual mileage reported by policyholders reduces the
estimated correlation to about 0.7. We view this result as consistent with the possibility that
underlying unobserved factors that aﬀect risk play an important role in generating the estimated
positive correlation between risk and risk aversion.
Finally, one should note that while the correlation parameter we estimate is extremely high,
the implied unconditional correlation between risk and risk aversion is much lower, and is less
than 0.2 across all reported speciﬁcations. This is because the coeﬃcients on the same regressor
(for example, the size of the car or whether the car is used for business) often aﬀect risk and risk
aversion in opposite directions.
Additional Speciﬁcations We have tried several other speciﬁcations in order to check the ro-
bustness of the results to diﬀerent assumptions. First, we estimate the model with a CARA speciﬁ-
40See also Israel (2005).
41Insurance companies typically do not use this self-reported mileage estimates as they are considered unreliable.
While companies could verify these estimates at the time of a claim, such reports are hard to enforce. An individual
can always claim that her ex-ante estimate was lower than it turned out to be.
25cation. The results are reported in Table 6. Due to its high third derivative and ﬂatter indiﬀerence
set, the CARA assumption results in lower estimates of the average level of risk aversion and the
variance of unobserved heterogeneity. The rest of the results are qualitatively very similar. Most
of the covariates take similar coeﬃcients in signs, magnitudes, and statistical signiﬁcance. The risk
regression changes very little, and the correlation remains virtually unchanged.
To account for potential heterogeneity in the information individuals have with respect to their
risk level, we try two alternatives. First, we estimate the model for experienced drivers only, namely
for drivers with ten years or more of driving experience. The underlying assumption is that such
experienced drivers, unlike new drivers, know their own risk rate much better, and our model, which
assumes that an individual perfectly knows her risk type, applies better for experienced drivers. The
results (Table 8) are virtually unchanged, and the correlation coeﬃc i e n ti so n l ys l i g h t l yl o w e r( 0.78).
Second, we estimate a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the model, which structurally allows for incomplete
information of individuals with respect to their risk types. We do so by assuming that individuals
are Bayesian and update their risk types over time, given information about the number of claims
they make each year. While we do not observe claim histories of individuals, we can simulate
such a history and integrate over the simulation draws. Thus, individuals’ information would be
related to their true type, and would be more precise with longer driving histories. Overall, this
seems to us an extreme version of incomplete information, as there are many other sources through
which individuals can learn about their own types, and thereby have better information about their
types than what we estimate them to have. The end of Appendix A provides more details of this
speciﬁcation and Table 9 reports the results. The qualitative results are very similar.
As we already mentioned, we also tried estimating the model when controlling for (self-reported)
estimated mileage. Due to partial coverage, this speciﬁcation results in omitting almost 50% of
the observations, which may introduce a selection bias. Nevertheless, the results are quite similar,
with the correlation coeﬃcient going down to about 0.7.T h ec o e ﬃcient on mileage is signiﬁcant
but small; this result implies that the elasticity of claim rate with respect to mileage is about
10%. We interpret this ﬁnding as consistent with the possibility that self-estimated mileage is not
a particularly reliable variable, meaning that the low estimated coeﬃcient on it is due to “errors
in variables,” biasing it towards zero. One could speculate that more precise mileage data would
have led to a further reduction in the correlation coeﬃcient, which is consistent with our earlier
discussion.
As already mentioned, we estimated the model incorporating average income in the same zip
code.42 While income obtains a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the risk aversion equation (and
an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient in the risk regression), it does not much aﬀect the reported results. The
correlation coeﬃcient is about 0.82, the level of risk aversion remains fairly similar and unobserved
heterogeneity is slightly higher. We also tried to estimate the model separately for each of the ﬁve
years. For the last two years of data, we encountered convergence problems. This may be due to
insuﬃcient exogenous variation in the data (see Figure 1), which leads to weak identiﬁcation. For
42The reason we do not use this income variable in the benchmark speciﬁcation is its imperfect coverage. It requires
us to omit almost 20% of the individuals.
26the ﬁrst three years most of the estimated coeﬃcients are qualitatively stable over time, although
their magnitude does tend to vary, and many of them lose signiﬁcance. The average level of risk
aversion increases over time, and so does its estimated variation. The correlation coeﬃcient, which
may be of particular interest, is consistently positive and signiﬁcant, although it takes lower values
than in the benchmark (pooled) regression; its values are 0.25 (0.12), 0.43 (0.11), and 0.58 (0.08)f o r
the ﬁrst, second, and third year, respectively (standard deviations in parentheses). It is important
to note that variation in the coeﬃcients over time is to be expected, due to selection. It is likely
that diﬀerent types of individuals have approached the company as it gained more experience. We
view the results from the benchmark model as reﬂecting an average customer of the company over
its ﬁrst ﬁve years of operation.
4.3 Counterfactuals
W ef o c u si nt h i ss e c t i o no nt h ea n a l y s i so fap r o ﬁt-maximizing choice of insurance contracts in
the presence of the two dimensions of private information. As our results only represent the dis-
tribution of risk and risk aversion in the population of customers we observe, and as we have no
information about the outside option of these customers, we hold this distribution ﬁxed throughout
our counterfactual exercises. To make the counterfactual exercise still meaningful, it is necessary
to minimize the potential for a signiﬁcant inﬂow or outﬂow from the observed population, as we
change the menu of deductible-premium combinations.
In light of this concern, we proceed by making the simplifying assumption that individuals make
their choices sequentially. They ﬁrst choose the insurance provider by only observing the “regular”
deductible-premium combination they are oﬀered. Once they decide to buy a policy from the
insurer, they decide which deductible-premium combination to purchase. This is clearly a strong
assumption, but, in our view, it is a reasonable approximation of reality, as the “regular” deductible
is the one always advertised and initially quoted, while the other options are only revealed once
the potential customer and the insurance sales person get into details. As a consequence of this
assumption, we do not analyze the optimality of the regular premium and regular deductible levels.
These are assumed to be dictated by competitive conditions. Instead, we focus our analysis on
the optimality of the choice of the level and price of the low deductible option. One should also
keep in mind that this assumption should hold much better locally than globally. As we investigate
deductible-premium combinations that are further away from those that are actually oﬀered, failure
of the assumption may become more prevalent.
Consider a particular individual. As far as the company is concerned, this individual can be


















where all parameters should be thought of as conditional on observables. When analyzing the
optimal menu to oﬀer such an individual, the company is assumed to be risk neutral and to maximize
27expected proﬁts. Below we analyze how the price and level of the low deductible option oﬀered by
the insurance company aﬀect the company’s expected proﬁts.
Suppose the company only oﬀered the “regular” deductible-premium combination, (dh,p h).L e t
the expected proﬁts from this strategy be π0.C o n s i d e r n o w t h e p r o ﬁts of the ﬁrm from oﬀering
a “low” deductible-premium combination, (dl,p l) with dl <d h and pl >p h.W ew i l la n a l y z et h e
optimality of the decision (dl,p l). As will become clear soon, it is easy to use a change in variables
and analyze the choice of ∆d = dh − dl and ∆p = pl − ph. Expected proﬁts are now given by:
max
∆d,∆p
{π0 +P r ( ri >r ∗
i(λi;∆d,∆p))[∆p − ∆d · E(λi|ri >r ∗
i(λi;∆d,∆p)]} (19)
The trade-oﬀ in the company’s decision is straightforward. Each new customer who chooses the
low combination pays an additional ∆p up-front, but saves ∆d for each accident she is involved in.
This translates into two eﬀects that enter the company’s decision problem. The ﬁrst is similar to a
standard pricing problem: higher (lower) price diﬀerence (deductible diﬀerence), ∆p (∆d), leads to
a higher markup (on those individuals who select the “low” combination), but to lower quantity (or
probability of purchase) as fewer individuals elect to choose the low deductible. This eﬀect enters
the proﬁt function through Pr(ri >r ∗
i(λi;∆d,∆p)) ≡ D(∆d,∆p). The second, composition eﬀect
arises because of adverse selection. As the price of the low deductible increases, those individuals
who still elect to choose the low combination are, ceteris paribus, those with higher risk. This
eﬀect enters through E(λi|ri >r ∗
i(λi;∆d,∆p)) ≡ λ(∆d,∆p). Its magnitude and sign depend on
the relative heterogeneity of λi and ri and on the correlation between them.



























Since neither D(∆d,∆p) nor λ(∆d,∆p) have a closed-form solution, we will analyze this decision
problem graphically, where D(∆d,∆p) and λ(∆d,∆p) are numerically computed using simulations
from their joint distribution.43
We will illustrate our analysis by using the mean individual in the data. Such an individual is
faced with a regular combination of (ph,d h) = (3190,1595) New Israeli Shekels (NIS). The current
low combination oﬀered to her is (pl,d l) = (3381,957) NIS, i.e. (∆p,∆d) = (191,638). According













(0.172)2 0.861 · 0.172 · 2.986
0.861 · 0.172 · 2.986 (2.986)2
!!
(22)
In each ﬁgure discussed below, we also present similar exercises for cases of zero correlation and
negative correlation (opposite sign, same magnitude of 0.861) between risk and risk aversion. This
should help in the interpretation of the various forces in play.
43These ﬁrst order conditions could, in principle, be used as “supply side” moment conditions for estimation.
28To get intuition for the diﬀerent eﬀects, Figure 4 presents the estimated distribution in the
space of (λi,r i). A small increase (decrease) in ∆p (∆d) shifts the indiﬀerence set up and to
the right, thereby making some marginal individuals, who were previously just to the right of it,
switch to choosing the regular deductible. The demand trade-oﬀ is just the comparison between the
marginal loss of the company from all the marginal individuals who no longer buy higher coverage
vis-a-vis the higher proﬁts made from the infra-marginal individuals who still elect to choose higher
coverage. Figure 4 also helps in illustrating the eﬀect of adverse selection and the importance of
the correlation coeﬃcient. As the menu shifts to the right, the positive correlation implies that the
marginal individuals have higher risk than the average. This means that “losing” them (namely,
having them buy less coverage) is not as costly for the insurance company, as such individuals
are, on average, more adversely selected. A negative correlation, for example, would have made
these marginal individuals more valuable, thereby decreasing the incentive to increase prices or
deductibles from the current levels.
Figure 5 presents the implications of the model as we vary the low deductible level, keeping
the premium charged for it ﬁxed at the true price of ∆p = 191 NIS. The upper panel shows the
eﬀect on proﬁts. It implies that the current low deductible beneﬁto f640 NIS results in additional
annual proﬁts of about 3.4 NIS per customer. This is about 0.34 percent of total operating proﬁts
per customer, which are about 1,000 NIS. Note, however, that after subtracting the administrative
and claim-handling costs associated with each customer and claim (which, by assumption, are
independent of the deductible choice), the relative magnitude of this eﬀect will be much higher.
Note, also, that the estimates imply that the current low deductible level is suboptimal. By setting
a smaller low deductible beneﬁto f∆d = 350 N I S( w h i c hi m p l i e sa290 increase in the level of the
low deductible), additional proﬁts can be increased to 6.3 NIS. There is no apparent reason, of
course, to limit the choice of the company to only one additional deductible level. More degrees
of freedom in choosing the menu oﬀered will lead, of course, to higher proﬁts. In that sense, the
estimates provided can be thought of as lower bounds.
The other two panels of Figure 5 present the way the eﬀect on proﬁts is generated, by analyzing
the eﬀect of the deductible level on the demand for low deductible, D(∆d,∆p), and on the compo-
sition eﬀect, λ(∆d,∆p). The former is simply generated by the distribution of certainty equivalents
implied by the joint distribution of λi and ri (see also Landsberger and Meilijson, 1999). It has an
S shape due to the joint Lognormality assumptions. The shape of the composition eﬀect is driven
b yt h er e l a t i v ev a r i a n c eo fλi and ri and by the correlation coeﬃcient, as already discussed. As the
estimates imply that most of the variation in certainty equivalents is driven by variation in ri,t h e
strong positive correlation implies that the composition eﬀect is monotonically decreasing in the
deductible level. As the low deductible option becomes more favorable, more people choose it, with
the most risky individuals being the ﬁrst.
It is interesting to see that the eﬀect of the deductible level on the composition eﬀect is dra-
matically diﬀerent when the correlation between risk and risk aversion is zero or negative. With
zero correlation, the two extremes of the deductible range are roughly the same, as they are solely
driven by the risk aversion distribution, which is uncorrelated with risk. Only at interim levels
29of deductibles do we see the eﬀect of adverse selection. Note also that in such a case, the op-
timal deductible beneﬁt is higher, and at the optimum there is little diﬀerence between the risk
of individuals who choose low deductibles and the rest of the population.44 Finally, one can see
that when risk and risk aversion are negatively correlated the observed relationship between the
deductible level and the composition eﬀect is mostly reversed. This is because the eﬀect of risk
aversion dominates that of adverse selection due to its higher variance. Along these lines, we have
also computed the optimal pricing by the company when each of the dimensions of heterogeneity is
shut down. The results are consistent with the observation that adverse selection is less important
than selection on risk aversion. By ignoring adverse selection, the optimal pricing does not change
much. By ignoring heterogeneity in risk aversion, the optimal pricing and the shape of the proﬁt
function is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
5 Caveats: Discussion of Unmodeled Elements
The empirical model we estimated is, of course, very stylized. Below we discuss how relaxing
various modeling assumptions may aﬀect the results. Before we do so, let us make two comments
that apply to most of this section. First, each discussion below opens up an additional dimension,
which we abstract from in the estimated model. Since the data, in principle, only includes important
variation in two dimensions (claims and coverage choices) and since we already try to identify two
dimensions of unobservables (risk and risk aversion), any additional dimension can only be identiﬁed
using either richer data or additional parametric restrictions. In other words, with the existing data,
any pattern that can be generated by any of the mechanisms discussed below, could be generated
by our original model with suﬃciently ﬂexible distributional assumptions. This is the main reason
why we prefer to discuss the eﬀects of these additional dimensions here rather than to incorporate
them in the estimated model. Where appropriate, we discuss what kind of data would have been
useful to address each point.
The second comment is that we have reported two diﬀerent sets of results, one regarding the
parameter estimates for the distribution of risk aversion and the other regarding the couterfactual
pricing exercise. As we discuss below, some assumptions may be important for one of these sets of
results but not for the other. This is because the estimates of risk aversion are only important to
the extent that they can be extrapolated to other decision contexts. Therefore, any idiosyncratic
eﬀect of the particular choice under consideration may make this extrapolation less accurate. In
contrast, the counterfactual exercise investigates the eﬀect of pricing within the same context,
making it less sensitive to the exact interpretation of risk aversion, but potentially more sensitive
to the (unobserved) outside option.
44This may point to another potential reason that empirical papers do not ﬁnd evidence for adverse selection. Not
only is adverse selection dominated by higher unobserved variation in risk preferences, it may be also mitigated by
the optimal decisions of insurance companies.
30Moral hazard Throughout our analysis we have abstracted from moral hazard, i.e. we assumed
that λi can vary across individuals but is invariant to the coverage choice. There are two types
of moral hazard that may play a role in this context, making λi higher for higher coverage (low
deductible). First, individuals with less coverage, who face higher loss in the event of an accident,
may take greater precaution and drive more carefully, thereby reducing their accident risk rate.
Second, conditional on a claim event, people with higher deductibles are less likely to ﬁle a claim:
t h e r ee x i s t sar a n g eo fc l a i m sf o rw h i c hﬁling is proﬁtable only under a low deductible. This second
eﬀect is often called ex-post moral hazard. We discuss each eﬀect in turn.
It seems reasonable to conjecture that, ceteris paribus, insured individuals will drive less carefully
than uninsured ones. It may also seem reasonable that the existence of a deductible may make
individuals more careful about small damages to their car (which is, in fact, one of the primary
reasons for the existence of deductibles). When the coverage choice, however, always includes
a deductible, and diﬀerent deductibles are similar in their magnitudes, it seems less likely that
driving/care behavior will be aﬀected.45 If driving behavior is aﬀected by the deductible choice,
this will likely bias our estimates of risk aversion downwards. To see this, note that adjusting
behavior will help individuals to self insure against uninsured costs. This will make higher coverage
(low deductible) less attractive, requiring individuals to be even more risk averse than we estimate
them to be in order to buy higher coverage. Finally, to separately identify moral hazard would
require another dimension of the data such as a panel structure, over which risk types remain ﬁxed
but coverage choices exogenously vary (see also Chiappori and Heckman, 2000).
We abstract from the second potential eﬀect, that of ex-post moral hazard, based on our data.
Data on the claim amounts show that about 99% of the claims ﬁled by policyholders with low
deductible policies were for amounts greater than the higher deductible level. In other words, if
individuals ﬁled a claim for any loss which exceeds their deductible, the above analysis suggests
that 99% of the claims would have been ﬁled under either deductible choice. Figure 6 provides more
details. The above exercise may be somewhat misleading as one may be worried that when ﬁling a
claim, an individual will take into account the dynamic costs as well. The dynamic costs of ﬁling
a claim come into play through its eﬀect on experience rating, which increases future insurance
premia. These dynamic eﬀects do not depend on the deductible level at the time of the claim, so
they simply enter in an additive way.
Using our data on individuals who renew their policies with the company (these renewals are
not used for estimation), we can assess how big the dynamics eﬀects are. These data show that
the price eﬀect of a claim lasts for three years, and is highest when an individual ﬁles her second
claim within a year. In such a case, she would face about 20 percent increase in her insurance
premium in the subsequent year, 10 percent in the year after, and 5 percent in the third year after
the claim. The regular premium is, in general, about twice the regular deductible amount, so an
45This assumption is also supported by the following observation. In an informal survey we conducted among our
colleagues, all of them were aware of a deductible in their auto insurance policy, but less than 20 percent knew its
level. This does not imply that 80 percent of our colleagues did not pay attention to their deductible choice at the
time the choice was made. It does imply, however, that their behavior cannot depend on the deductible amount.
31upper bound for the dynamic costs is about 70%. In most cases the actual dynamic costs are much
lower than this upper bound, as the dynamic costs of, say, the ﬁrst claim within a year are minimal.
In addition, an individual can always opt out of the contract and switch to a diﬀerent insurance
provider. This is likely to reduce her dynamic costs because in Israel, unlike in the US and in many
other countries, there is no public record for past claims. Therefore, insurance providers can take
full advantage of past records only for their past customers. For this reason, new customers will,
of course, face higher premia than existing ones, but the premium increase would not be as high as
it would have been with the old insurance provider. This is due to the presence of “innocent” new
customers, who are pooled together with the switchers (see also Cohen, 2003).46 Using this 70% as
a conservative upper bound, we can repeat a similar exercise to ﬁnd out that about 93% of those
claims ﬁled by individuals with a low deductible were higher than 1.7 times the regular deductible
level. While this is not negligible, it applies for only a tiny fraction of the individuals. For the vast
majority of them, the 99% ﬁgure is the relevant one. Therefore, ex-post moral hazard is unlikely
to play a major role in this setting, and one can abstract from the loss distribution and focus on
claim rates, as we do in this paper.47 Finally, we should note that, as with driving behavior, to
the extent that this assumption slightly biases our results, it should do so by making the choice of
a low deductible slightly less attractive than we estimate it to be, thus implying that individuals
may be slightly more risk averse than our estimates suggest.
Incomplete information by individuals We assume through most of the paper that individu-
als have perfect information about their risk types λi. Note, ﬁrst, that this is a stronger assumption
than we need. Under expected utility framework, utility is linear in probabilities, so all we need is
that individuals’ expected risk rate is the true one, i.e. b λi ≡ E(e λi|Ii)=λi where e λi is individual i’s
perceived risk rate, and Ii is individual i’s information at the time of the coverage choice. Namely,
individuals may be uncertain about their risk type, but their point estimate is correct. Still, it is
reasonable to argue that this is a rather extreme assumption. There are several channels through
which incomplete information may operate. Let us consider two such cases. First, suppose that
individuals are correct, but only on average, i.e. that b λi = λi +  i where E( i)=0 . The intuition
for this case is similar to an “errors in variables” model, and in principle will result in an even less
important role for adverse selection. Given that we ﬁnd relatively little role for adverse selection,
this bias will not change this conclusion. This may be even more pronounced if Corr(λi,  i) < 0,
which reﬂects a reasonable assumption of “reversion to the mean,” i.e. that individuals’ estimates
of their risk types are some weighted average of their true risk types and the average risk type of
individuals who are similar (on observables) to them. The conclusion may go in the other way
46New customers may voluntarily report their claim history to their new insurance provider. Voluntary disclosure
of past claims is, as may be expected, not truthful. Our data suggest an unconditional claim rate of 24.53% in our
sample population. Our data on claim history, as voluntarily disclosed by the same indivduals, suggest a claim rate
of 6.04%, which is four times lower.
47This last statement may not be as clean once we take into account the choice of “high” and “very high” deductibles,
which are at much higher levels. This is one additional reason to focus only on the choice between “low” and “regular”
deductibles.
32only if the mistakes go in the other direction, according to which individuals who are riskier than
average believe that they are even more risky than they truly are. This, we believe, is less likely.
Finally, as discussed in the previous section, Table 8 reports the results for experienced drivers
only, who are likely to have better information about their risk rates. The fact that the results
do not change much may suggest that the main results are not highly sensitive to heterogeneity in
information. In addition, Table 9 reports the estimation of the model under a particular incomplete
information assumption, and also suggests that the main qualitative results are robust to the
information structure.
Additional cost of an accident Our model assumes that, in the event of an accident, the
only incurred costs are those associated with the deductible payment. In practice, however, other
transaction costs may be associated with an accident, such as the time spent for appraisal of the
damage, the costs associated with renting a replacement car for the duration of a repair, etc. Such
costs could be readily incorporated into the model; one can think about them as an additional
(mandatory) deductible. To illustrate, we assume that these costs are known in advance and are
g i v e nb yac o n s t a n tc (which could, in principle, vary with each individual). Since c will not vary
with the chosen level of deductible, it will not aﬀect the value ∆d and will only enter the empirical






and everything else will remain the same.
This implies that, in principle, such costs will have no eﬀect on the results of the counterfactual
exercise, which are still valid. The costs will, however, aﬀect the interpretation of the estimates of
risk aversion. In particular, instead of the distribution of r we will now be estimating the distribution
of rd+c
d , so the reported estimates of the coeﬃc i e n to fa b s o l u t er i s ka v e r s i o nw i l lb eb i a s e du p w a r d s .
The magnitude of the bias depends on the size of these transaction costs c compared to the average
deductible d.I fc is relatively small, the bias is negligible. If, however, c is as big as the (average)
deductible level, all our reported estimates of the level of risk aversion should be divided by two
(but the coeﬃcients on observables, which are semi-elasticities, will not change). The intuition
would be similar, but more involved, if c varies across individuals but not proportionally to d.I n
the absence of data about transaction costs, all one can do is introspect and use priors for the
relative importance of c.
Sample selection Given that the company is a somewhat non-standard insurance provider and
that it is new in the market, it is potentially more likely to attract individuals who are more likely
to experiment with new ways to do business, and may be in general less risk averse than the general
population. In Table 10 we compare the demographics of our sample of policyholders with those
of the general Israeli population. This comparison reﬂects a similar intuition: compared with the
general population our average policyholder is somewhat younger, more educated, more likely to
33be a male, and less likely to be married or an immigrant. This direction of selection may also apply
to unobserved risk preferences, thereby making our policyholders, on average, less risk averse than
a representative individual. This may suggest that the level of risk aversion that we ﬁnd can be
viewed as a lower bound on the level of risk aversion in the general population.
One potential way to model sample selection is to allow for an additional outside option to be
selected. For the vast majority of the individuals we observe, the outside option is to purchase
similar insurance from competing insurance agencies. Unfortunately, data on the structure of com-
peting contracts, their prices, and the way they vary by individual characteristics are unavailable.
This makes us uncomfortable to try to model sample selection, as results from any such model
will be driven by our assumptions rather than by meaningful variation in the data. Therefore, we
choose to report the results for the sampled, potentially selected population. The results are still
meaningful for two reasons. First, as mentioned before, this is a large population, accounting for
about seven percent of all drivers in Israel. Second, to the extent that our estimates suggest higher
levels of risk aversion than previously estimated and that the sample selection is likely to bias these
estimates downwards, the results are still highly informative.
One should note that the potential sample selection discussed above has no direct impact for the
counterfactual exercise, which should be taken with respect to the population at hand. There is,
however, a related selection problem, which may aﬀect the counterfactuals. In our counterfactual
exercise we assume that as the company, say, increases the low deductible level, consumers switch
to higher coverage, but remain with the same company. If increasing the low deductible makes
individuals switch to a diﬀerent company, the beneﬁts from increasing the low deductible would
be lower. We believe that this is not a major problem because of the signiﬁcant cost advantage
the company enjoyed and the evidence in the literature (discussed in the beginning of Section
2) emphasizing that the choice of direct insurers is driven, to a large extent, by non-monetary
“amenities.” This makes it reasonable to think about the choice we analyze as a nested decision
problem: which type of company to choose, and then which deductible level. This makes our
counterfactual analysis valid. Finally, one should note that the two potential selection problems
cannot both be important at the same time. The ﬁrst may be important only if direct insurers are
p e r c e i v e dt ob ev e r yd i ﬀerent from traditional insurers, while the second is important only if all
insurers are the same, so competition is primarily channeled through the ﬁnancial parameters of
the contracts.
Deviations from expected utility theory Throughout the paper we restrict attention to
expected utility maximizers. Despite much evidence in the literature against some of the predictions
of expected utility theory, it still seems to us the most natural benchmark to specify, and one which
facilitates comparison to previous studies. It is important to note that expected utility theory is
assumed; it is not and cannot be tested within our framework. Given our cross-sectional analysis,
which, in principle, allows ﬂexible forms of unobserved heterogenei t yi nr i s kp r e f e r e n c e s ,t h e r ea r en o
testable restrictions imposed by expected utility theory. We should also note that much (but not all)
of the documented evidence against expected utility theory arises with extreme risk probabilities,
34which are close to zero or one. Our data (and our esti m a t e s )a r eb a s e do nr i s kp r o b a b i l i t i e sw h i c h
are roughly in the range of 0.1 − 0.35 (see Figure 4). Over this range, expected utility seems to
perform better. Finally, it is important to stress two points. First, at the conceptual level, it
is straightforward to use an alternative theory of decisions under uncertainty. If, conditional on
objective risk, individuals vary in a single dimension, the same conceptual model and empirical
strategy can be applied. All one needs to do is to specify the parameter over which decisions
vary, and construct an indiﬀerence set in the space of the speciﬁed parameter and (objective)
risk types, similar to the one presented in Figure 3. Second, any alternative model of decisions
under uncertainty would require us to take an even stronger view regarding the parameterized
objective function. For example, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) would require
us to parameterize not only the curvature of individuals’ utility functions, but, in addition, their
reference points, for which there is no natural choice in our context. Similar issues will arise if we
tried to apply decision weights (Tversky and Wakker, 1995) or measures of, say, over-conﬁdence
with respect to driving ability.
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
The paper makes two separate contributions. First, from a methodological standpoint, we lay
out a conceptual framework through which one can formulate and estimate a demand system
for individually-customized contracts. The key data requirements for this approach are contract
choices, individual choice sets, and ex-post risk realizations. Since such data may be available in
other settings, the methodological framework may be useful to uncover structural parameters in
such settings. As an example, one could consider annuity data and use guarantee-period choices
and mortality data to identify between heterogeneity in risk (mortality) and in preferences, such as
bequest motives. Similarly, one could consider loan data and use loan-duration choices and default
data to identify between heterogeneity in risk (default) and in credit constraints.
Second, from an economic standpoint, we provide a new set of estimates for the degree and
heterogeneity of (absolute) risk aversion. Our results can be summarized by the following four
ﬁndings. First, the average coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion we estimate is higher than other
estimates available in the literature. Second, we ﬁnd important relationships between individual
characteristics and risk aversion. In particular, we ﬁnd positive correlation between the degree of
risk avesion and various measures of income or wealth. Third, we ﬁnd that unobserved risk aversion
is positively correlated with unobserved risk. Finally, we ﬁnd that unobserved heterogeneity in risk
aversion is greater than unobserved heterogeneity in risk. The last two ﬁndings have important
implications for the design and pricing of optimal insurance contracts.
Many econometric applications structurally estimate utility parameters. Often, however, these
estimated utility parameters are context dependent (e.g. the willingness to pay for an extra horse
power of a car), and therefore are not interesting per se. Rather, we are interested in the implication
of their estimated values for pricing, substitution patterns, and welfare. Our estimates of risk
aversion also serve a similar role; they inform us about optimal pricing and welfare in the auto
35insurance market. In addition, however, we might be interested in their values directly, as they
may help to explain choices made by individuals in other risky contexts.
It is natural to ask to what extent these parameters are relevant in other contexts. This is
essentially an empirical question, which can be answered only by estimating risk aversion parameters
for a variety of bet sizes and in a variety of contexts. Since isolating risk preferences in many contexts
is hard, such exercises are rare (providing the main motivation for the current work), leaving us
with no deﬁnite answer for the scope of markets for which our estimates may be relevant. On one
hand, Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) argue that diﬀerent decisions in life are taken
in diﬀerent contexts, and therefore may be subject to diﬀerent parameters in the utility function
(or, equivalently, to diﬀerent “relevant wealth levels”). According to this view, one should not
extrapolate our estimates to other contexts. On the other hand, classical theory suggests that each
individual has one value function over her life-time wealth, so all risky decisions take into account the
same value function and are therefore subject to the same risk preferences. Our view is somewhere
in between. We are more comfortable with extrapolation of our risk aversion estimates to setups
which are “closer” to the auto insurance market context in which these parameters are estimated.
When doing so, one should assess various factors over which contexts may diﬀer. Such factors
include the size of the bets and diﬀerent factors that may change informational and behavioral
eﬀects, such as default options, framing, and rarity of the events considered. Finally, selection of
participants into a particular market may be an important factor. Given our estimate of large
heterogeneity of unobserved risk preferences, one may expect strong selection on unobservables in
a wide range of voluntary markets, making our estimates more representative, perhaps, for markets
in which participation is either mandatory or driven by other factors, which are unlikely to be
correlated with risk preferences.
Selection into the market may be the primary reason why our estimates of risk aversion are
generally higher than comparable estimates found in the literature (in, say, Gertner, 1993; Metrick,
1995; and Jullien and Salanie, 2000). Some economists consider our average estimates of risk aver-
sion as surprisingly high. By introspection, we think that an average individual who is indiﬀerent
about a ﬁfty-ﬁfty lottery of gain $100 lose $61 is not unreasonable. In fact, many economists believe
that high static risk aversion is a good candidate for explaining the high equity premium.48 To
the extent that one is comfortable extrapolating our risk aversion estimates to other settings, they
provide some support to this view.
Our second set of ﬁndings concerns the way risk aversion relates to observable characteristics.
T h e s er e s u l t sm a yb em o r er o b u s ta c r o s sd i ﬀerent settings. Even if the magnitude of risk aversion
may be sensitive to context, the way it varies with gender, wealth, or age may be less context
dependent. Thus, for example, our ﬁnding that women are more risk averse than men may generalize
across a variety of situations. Other ﬁndings suggest that the estimated coeﬃcient of risk aversion
increases with observables that are related to income and wealth. As already discussed, this does
not necessarily imply that we reject the widely held belief of the decreasing absolute risk aversion
48See Mehra and Prescott (1985), and Kocherlacota (1996) for a more recent review.
36property. The ﬁnding is more plausibly rationalized by an underlying positive correlation between
wealth and risk aversion across individuals. Testing between these two alternatives would require
diﬀerent data, with a panel structure and exogenous shocks to wealth. In a cross-section, the
underlying relationship between wealth and risk preferences can go either way. While lower risk
aversion may be associated with higher propensity to become an entrepreneur, and thereby have
higher wealth, it may also be associated with lower propensity to save or invest in education,
aﬀecting wealth the other way. Therefore, one important message of this ﬁnding is that accounting
for heterogeneity in preferences may be important, as representative consumer models may provide
misleading interpretations for otherwise natural results.
T h el a s tt w os e t so fﬁndings concern the relative heterogeneity in risk aversion and that of
risk, and the correlation between risk and risk aversion. In contrast to the preceding discussion,
these ﬁndings may be sensitive to the market context. While measures of risk aversion may extend
across contexts, the measure of risk is speciﬁc to the application we study. Thus, any relationship
between risk and risk aversion may change once risk takes other forms. First, within the auto
insurance market, one could measure accident risk in various ways. We use claim propensity, as
this is the relevant measure for the decision at hand. Other measures of risk, such a risk per mile
travelled, injury propensity, or expected value of the claim may relate diﬀerently to risk aversion,
as they depend on a diﬀerent set of latent variables. Moreover, risk in the auto insurance market
may be conceptually diﬀerent from risk in other markets. In many insurance markets, such as life
insurance, health insurance, and long term care insurance, risk is independent across individuals,
and is therefore primarily driven by individual characteristics and behavior. In auto insurance,
much of the risk depends on coordination among drivers, and therefore may be more related to
relative (rather than absolute) individual characteristics and behavior.
Thus, although our ﬁnding of a strong positive correlation between risk and risk aversion may be
somewhat surprising, we do not view it as an evidence against other ﬁndings of negative correlation
between risk and risk aversion in other contexts, such as long term care insurance (Finkelstein
and McGarry, 2003). The positive correlation we ﬁnd is also consistent with the fact that the
reduced-form bivariate Probit tests for adverse selection in our data provide evidence for adverse
selection (Cohen, 2005), while similar reduced-form tests in other contexts do not. As noted by
Finkelstein and McGarry (2003), positive correlation does make these tests more likely to conclude
that adverse selection exists.
Finally, we ﬁnd that unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences is more important than het-
erogeneity in risk. This general ﬁnding seems consistent with the general message of the recent
inﬂuential literature on adverse selection (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Finkelstein and McGarry,
2003; Chiappori et al., forthcoming). It might be driven by the casual evidence that insurance com-
panies exert much eﬀort and resources in collecting consumer data, which are informative about risk
classiﬁcation, but not much data about risk preferences.49 We illustrate the empirical importance
49This choice of data collection eﬀorts may be justiﬁed if it is easier for such ﬁrms to price discriminate based on
risk, but it is harder to price discriminate based on preferences. Without cost-based (i.e. risk-based) justiﬁcation for
prices, price discrimination may lead, for example, to consumer backlash.
37of our ﬁndings for the analysis of optimal contracts in a u t oi n s u r a n c e .T h ep r e s e n c eo fm o r et h a n
one dimension of unobserved heterogeneity may dramatically change the nature of these contracts,
and the nature of the observed relationship in the data. Theory is still not fully developed for such
multi-dimensional screening problems, as it typically requires a small number of types (Landsberger
and Meilijson, 1999), restricts the two dimensions to be independent of each other (Rochet and
Stole, 2002), or assumes that the number of instruments available to the monopolist is not smaller
than the dimension of unobserved heterogeneity (Matthews and Moore, 1987). Armstrong (1999),
who analyzes optimal regulatory contracts in the presence of both cost and demand uncertainties,
may be the closest theoretical work to the framework suggested here. It cannot be directly applied,
however, as it uses simplifying linearity assumptions, which would be hard to impose in the current
context. Our results indicate that many applications can beneﬁt from extending the theory to
include the more general case, such as the one analyzed here. Such a theory may also serve as
a guide for using supply-side moment conditions in this context. Our counterfactual analysis in
Section 4.3 is a very preliminary start in this direction.
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In this appendix we describe the setup of the Gibbs Sampler that we use to estimate the model.
One of the main advantages of the Gibbs Sampler is its ability to allow for data augmentation
of latent variables (Tanner and Wong, 1987). In our context, this amounts to augmenting the
individual-speciﬁc risk aversion and risk type, namely {λi,r i}n
i=1 as additional parameters.
We can write the model as follows:
lnλi = x0
iβ + εi (24)
lnri = x0
iγ + υi (25)
choicei =
(
1 if ri >r i(λ)
0 if ri <r i(λ)
(26)





































































. The set of parameters for which we want to have a posterior distribution is given
by θ = {δ,Σ,{ui}n
i=1}. The prior speciﬁes that {δ,Σ} are independent of {ui}n
i=1. {δ,Σ} have a




iid ∼ N(0,Σ) (29)
Σ−1 ∼ Wishart2(a,Q) (30)



















For Σ−1 we use a convenient diﬀuse prior, i.e. a =0and Q−1 =0 .
The part of the Gibbs Sampler which is less standard in this case involves the sampling from
the conditional distribution of the augmented parameters, {ui}n
i=1. Each individual is independent
of the others, so conditional on the other parameters, it does not depend on other individuals’
augmented data. Thus, all we need to describe is the conditional probability of ui.N o t e t h a t
conditional on δ we have εi =l nλi − x0
iβ and υi =l nri − x0
iγ so we can instead focus on sampling













if choicei = I(ri <r i(λ))


















if choicei = I(ri <r i(λ))
0 if choicei 6= I(ri <r i(λ))
(34)
where p(x,claims,t)=xclaims exp(−xt) is proportional to the probability density function of the







is proportional to the Normal probability
density function.
The posterior for lnri is a truncated normal, for which we use a simple “invert cdf” sam-
pling (Devroye, 1986).50 The posterior for lnλi is more tricky. We use a “slice sampler” to
do so (Damien et al., 1999). The basic idea is to rewrite Pr(λi)=b0(λi)b1(λi)b2(λi) where
b0(λi) is truncated normal distribution, and b1(λi) and b2(λi) are deﬁned below. We can then
augment the data with two additional variables, u1
i and u2
i, which (conditional on λi)a r ed i s -













b2(λi) = b0(λi)I(0 ≤ u1
i ≤ b1(λi))I(0 ≤ u2
i ≤ b2(λi)).U s -
i n gt h i sf o r mw eh a v et h a tb1(lnλi)=λ
claimsi
i =( e x p ( l n λi))claimsi and b2(lnλi)=e x p ( −λiti)=
exp(−ti exp(lnλi)).B e c a u s e b1(·) and b2(·) are both monotone functions, conditional on u1i and
u2i this just means that b−1
1 (u1i)= lnu1i
claimsi is a lower bound for lnλi (for claimsi > 0)a n dt h a t
b−1
2 (u2i)=l n ( −lnu2i) − lnti is an upper bound for lnλi.T h u s , w e c a n j u s t s a m p l e λi from a
truncated normal distribution, after we modify the bounds according to u1
i and u2
i.
In the end of Section 4 we add to the model incomplete information of individuals about their
own types. Individuals’ type are ﬁxed over their lifetime, and individuals are Bayesian and update
50Let F(x) be the cumulative distribution function. The “invert cdf” sampling draws from this distrubtion by
drawing u from [0,1] and computing F
−1(u). In principle, one can use the sampling procedure suggested by Geweke
(1991), which avoids computing F
−1 and therefore is more eﬃcient. It turns out, however, that vectorizing the
algorithm is much easier when we use Devroye (1986). The vectorization entails enormous computational beneﬁts
when coded in Matlab.
43their own type by their claim experience. Since expected utility is linear in claim probabilities,
only individuals’ ex-post mean will aﬀect their coverage choices. If individuals have a prior which
follows a Gamma(α,β) distribution,51 their posterior mean is given by ci+α
li+ 1
β
where c is the number
of claims historically ﬁled and li is the individual’s driving experience (license years). Let b λi denote
the posterior mean. The assumptions imply that b λi(li + 1
β) − α is distributed Poisson(λili).T h e
rest of the model is as before, with b λi used instead of λi to explain the coverage choice. Thus,
to implement it within the Gibbs sampler, we augment b λi as well. The conditional distribution
for ri|λi,b λi is as before, with b λi (rather than λi)a ﬀecting the truncation point. The conditional
distribution for b λi|λi,r i is a linear transformation of a truncated Poisson, with the truncation point
i st h es a m ea st h eo n eu s e da b o v ef o rλi. Finally, the conditional distribution for λi|b λi,r i is, as
before, of an unknown form. Fortunately, however, the assumptions make it very similar to the one
before, with the following modiﬁcations. First, it is not truncated. Second, b λi provides information






∝ p(λi,b λi(li +
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Because the two ﬁrst elements follow a Poisson process, however, it is proportional to p(x,claims,t)=
xclaimsi+ci exp(−x(ti + li)), making it very similar to the form of the benchmark model.
BV a r i a b l e D e ﬁnitions
Below we describe the variables which may not be self-explanatory:
• Education - “Technical” education refers to post high school education, which does not result
in an academic degree.
• Emigrant - A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the individual was not born in Israel.
• Car value - Current estimated “blue book” value of the car.
• License years - Number of years since the individual obtained driving license.
• Good driver - A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the individual is classiﬁed as a good
driver. The classiﬁcation is made by the company, based on the other observables, and sug-
gests that the individual is likely to be a low-risk driver. We do not know the exact functional
form for this classiﬁcation. One can view this as an informative non-linear functional form of
the other observables already in the regressions.
51Note that the Gamma assumption is similar, but not identical, to the Loglinear distribution we use for estimation.
As will be clear below, the beneﬁt of this slight internal inconsistency is very attractive computationally, for the
construction of the Gibbs sampler.
44• “Any Driver” - A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the policy stipulates that any driver
can drive the car. If it does not stipulate it, the car is insured only if the policy holder (and
sometimes his/her spouse) drives the car.
• Secondary car - A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the car is not the main car in the
household.
• Business use - A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the policy holder uses the car for
business.
• Commercial car - A dummy variable which equal to 1 if the car is deﬁned as a commercial
vehicle (e.g. pick-up truck).
• Estimated mileage - Predicted annual mileage (in kilometers) by the policy holder. The
company does not use this variable for pricing, as it is believed to be unreliable.
• History - The number of years (up to 3) prior to the starting date of the policy for which the
policy holder reports his/her past claim history.
• Claim history - The number of claims per year for the policy holder over the 3 (sometimes
less) years prior to the starting date of the policy.
• Young driver - For drivers below the age of 25, the policy holder has to separately report the
details of the young driver (which may be the policy holder or someone else).
• Company year - Year dummies, which span our ﬁve-year observation period. The ﬁrst year
dummy is equal to 1 for policies started between 11/1/1994 and 10/31/1995, the second year
dummy is equal to 1 for policies started between 11/1/1995 and 10/31/1996, and so forth.
45Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Covariates
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Demographics: Age 105,800 41.14 12.37 18.06 89.43
Female 105,800 0.32 0.47 0 1
Family Single 105,800 0.143 0.35 0 1
Married 105,800 0.779 0.42 0 1
Divorced 105,800 0.057 0.23 0 1
Widower 105,800 0.020 0.14 0 1
Refused to Say 105,800 0.001 0.04 0 1
Education Elementary 105,800 0.016 0.12 0 1
High School 105,800 0.230 0.42 0 1
Technical 105,800 0.053 0.22 0 1
Academic 105,800 0.233 0.42 0 1
No Response 105,800 0.468 0.50 0 1
Emigrant 105,800 0.335 0.47 0 1
Car Attributes: Value (current NIS)a 105,800 66,958.41 37,376.76 4,000 617,000
Car Age 105,800 3.91 2.94 0 14
Commercial Car 105,800 0.083 0.28 0 1
Engine (cc) 105,800 1,567.94 384.68 700 5,000
Driving: License Years 105,798 18.18 10.08 0 63
Good Driver 105,800 0.548 0.50 0 1
“Any Driver” 105,800 0.257 0.44 0 1
Secondary Car 105,800 0.151 0.36 0 1
Business Use 105,800 0.082 0.27 0 1
Estimated Mileage (km) 60,422 14,031.09 5,890.50 1,000 32,200
History 105,800 2.847 0.61 0 3
Claim History 105,800 0.060 0.15 0 2.00
Young Driver: Age 17-19 105,800 0.029 0.17 0 1
19-21 105,800 0.051 0.22 0 1
21-24 105,800 0.089 0.29 0 1
>24 105,800 0.022 0.15 0 1
Experience <1 105,800 0.042 0.20 0 1
1-3 105,800 0.071 0.26 0 1
>3 105,800 0.079 0.27 0 1
Gender Male 105,800 0.113 0.32 0 1
Female 105,800 0.079 0.27 0 1
Company Year: First year 105,800 0.207 0.41 0 1
Second year 105,800 0.225 0.42 0 1
Third year 105,800 0.194 0.40 0 1
Fourth year 105,800 0.178 0.38 0 1
Fifth year 105,800 0.195 0.40 0 1
a The average exchange rate throughout the sample period was approximately 1 US dollar per 3.5 NIS, starting
at 1:3 in late 1994 and reaching 1:4 in late 1999.
46Table 2A: Descriptive Statistics - Menus, Choices, and Outcomes
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Menu: Deductible (current NIS)a Low 105,800 873.43 119.81 374.92 1,039.11
Regular 105,800 1,455.72 199.68 624.86 1,731.85
High 105,800 2,620.30 359.43 1,124.75 3,117.33
Very High 105,800 3,784.87 519.18 1,624.64 4,502.81
Premium (current NIS)a Low 105,800 3,380.57 914.04 1,324.71 19,239.62
Regular 105,800 3,189.22 862.30 1,249.72 18,150.58
High 105,800 2,790.57 754.51 1,093.51 15,881.76
Very High 105,800 2,551.37 689.84 999.78 14,520.46
∆p/∆d 105,800 0.328 0.06 0.30 1.80
Realization: Choice Low 105,800 0.178 0.38 0 1
Regular 105,800 0.811 0.39 0 1
High 105,800 0.006 0.08 0 1
Very High 105,800 0.005 0.07 0 1
Policy Termination Active 105,800 0.150 0.36 0 1
Canceled 105,800 0.143 0.35 0 1
Expired 105,800 0.707 0.46 0 1
Policy Length (years) 105,800 0.848 0.28 0.005 1.08
Claims All 105,800 0.208 0.48 0 5
Low 18,799 0.280 0.55 0 5
Regular 85,840 0.194 0.46 0 5
High 654 0.109 0.34 0 3
Very High 507 0.107 0.32 0 2
Claims per yearb All 105,800 0.245 0.66 0.00 198.82
Low 18,799 0.309 0.66 0.00 92.64
Regular 85,840 0.232 0.66 0.00 198.82
High 654 0.128 0.62 0.00 126.36
Very High 507 0.133 0.50 0.00 33.26
a The average exchange rate throughout the sample period was approximately 1 US dollar per 3.5 NIS, starting
at 1:3 in late 1994 and reaching 1:4 in late 1999.
b The mean and standard deviation of the claims per year are weighted by the policy length to adjust for variation
i nt h ee x p o s u r ep e r i o d .T h e s ea r et h eM a x i m u mL i k e l i h o o destimates of a simple Poisson model with no covariates.
Table 2B: Contract Choices and Realizations
Claims “Low” “Regular” “High” “Very High” Total Share
01 1 ,929 (19.3%) 49,281 (79.6%) 412 (0.7%) 299 (0.5%) 61,921 (100%) 80.343%
13 ,124 (23.9%) 9,867 (75.5%) 47 (0.4%) 35 (0.3%) 13,073 (100%) 16.962%
25 6 5 ( 3 0 .8%) 1,261 (68.8%) 4 (0.2%) 2 (0.1%) 1,832 (100%) 2.377%
37 1 ( 3 1 .4%) 154 (68.1%) 1 (0.4%) − 226 (100%) 0.293%
46 ( 3 5 .3%) 11 (64.7%) −− 17 (100%) 0.022%
51 ( 5 0 .0%) 1 (50.0%) −− 2 (100%) 0.003%
The table presents tabulation of choices and number of claims. To make things comparable, the ﬁgures are com-
puted only for individuals whose policies lasted at least 0.9 years (about 73% of the data). The bottom rows of Table
2A provide descriptive ﬁgures for the full data. The percentages in parentheses present the distribution of deductible
choices, conditional on the number of claims. The right-hand-side column presents the marginal distribution of the
number of claims.
47Table 3: Poisson Regressions (Dependent Variable: Number of Claims)
Variable IRRa z-stat p-value
Demographics: Age 0.992 -1.49 0.137
Age2 1.0001 1.92 0.055
Female 0.955 -2.83 0.005
Family Single 0.873 -0.77 0.441
Married 0.782 -1.41 0.158
Divorced 0.939 -0.36 0.720
Widower 0.887 -0.66 0.508
Education Elementary 0.939 -1.16 0.247
High School 0.989 -0.62 0.535
Technical 1.026 0.85 0.396
Academic 0.917 -4.61 0.000
Emigrant 1.021 1.28 0.200
Car Attributes: Log(Value) 1.127 4.28 0.000
Car Age 1.018 4.30 0.003
Commercial Car 0.869 -4.32 0.000
Log(Engine) 1.349 6.53 0.000
Driving: License Years 0.980 -5.95 0.000
License Years2 1.0002 3.24 0.001
Good Driver 0.983 -0.9 0.367
“Any Driver” 0.945 -3.33 0.001
Secondary Car 0.918 -4.10 0.000
Business Use 1.204 6.33 0.000
History 0.949 -4.76 0.000
Claim History 1.930 16.87 0.000
Young Driver: Age 17-19 dropped
19-21 1.072 1.31 0.191
21-24 0.973 -0.48 0.633
>24 0.811 -3.69 0.000
Experience <1d r o p p e d
1-3 0.785 -5.27 0.000
>3 0.754 -5.31 0.000
Gender Male 1.689 14.54 0.000
Female 1.457 9.39 0.000
Company Year: First year dropped
Second year 0.915 -4.49 0.000
Third year 0.933 -3.12 0.002
Fourth year 0.834 -7.83 0.000
Fifth year 0.581 -19.38 0.000
Obs 105,798
Pseudo R2 0.016
a IRR = Incidence Rate Ratio. Each ﬁgure should be interpreted as the increase/decrease in claim probability
as a result of an increase of one unit in the right-hand-side variable.
Variation in exposure (policy length) is accounted for.
48Table 4A: Probit Regressions (Dependent Variable: 1 if Low Deductible Chosen)
Variable (1) (2) (3)
dP/dX z − stat dP/dX z − stat dP/dX z − stat
Menu: ∆p/∆d - -0.354 -13.83 -0.351 -13.74
d - 0.00016 14.96 0.00016 14.81
b λ - - -0.153 -2.53
Demographics: Age -0.004 -4.85 -0.004 -4.73 -0.004 -5.13
Age2 4.5*10−5 5.13 4.4*10−5 5.06 4.9*10−5 5.51
Female 0.013 5.09 0.014 5.29 0.012 4.41
Family Single 0.044 1.24 0.038 1.1 0.032 0.92
Married 0.043 1.38 0.038 1.23 0.028 0.90
Divorced 0.050 1.37 0.046 1.28 0.042 1.18
Widower 0.042 1.14 0.036 1.01 0.030 0.84
Education Elementary -0.0010 -0.11 0.0005 0.06 -0.0019 -0.22
High School -0.0025 -0.83 -0.0010 -0.33 -0.0013 -0.44
Technical 0.0111 2.24 0.0127 2.56 0.0139 2.79
Academic 0.0027 0.90 0.0049 1.62 0.0015 0.45
Emigrant 2.2*10−4 0.08 -9.3*10−6 0.00 7.8*10−4 0.30
Car Attributes: Log(Value) 0.030 6.48 0.030 5.64 0.035 6.16
Car Age -1.7*10−3 -2.55 3.3*10−5 0.05 7.4*10−4 1.02
Commercial Car -0.029 -5.78 -0.027 -5.38 -0.032 -5.93
Log(Engine) 0.008 1.02 0.003 0.42 0.015 1.71
Driving: License Years 5.1*10−4 0.89 7.9*10−4 1.38 -5.6*10−5 -0.08
License Years2 -1.6*10−5 -1.46 -2.0*10−5 -1.8 -1.1*10−5 -0.9
Good Driver -0.015 -5.03 -0.012 -3.81 -0.012 -3.92
“Any Driver” -0.026 -9.94 -0.024 -9.23 -0.026 -9.57
Secondary Car -0.007 -2.17 -0.005 -1.52 -0.008 -2.26
Business Use -0.002 -0.32 -0.002 -0.37 0.006 1.01
History 0.017 8.17 0.018 8.42 0.015 6.10
Claim History 0.050 6.79 0.046 6.32 0.035 5.31
Young Driver: Age 17-19 dropped dropped dropped
19-21 -0.015 -1.51 -0.014 -1.44 -0.010 -1.04
21-24 -0.016 -1.50 -0.013 -1.23 -0.014 -1.30
>24 0.013 1.26 0.014 1.30 0.004 0.36
Experience <1 dropped dropped dropped
1-3 -0.001 -0.11 -0.002 -0.20 -0.015 -1.49
>3 0.041 3.85 0.037 3.48 0.019 1.62
Gender Male -0.001 -0.15 -0.001 -0.11 0.027 2.03
Female 0.018 2.33 0.018 2.28 0.038 3.40
Company Year: First year dropped dropped dropped
Second year -0.086 -33.35 -0.088 -34.08 -0.091 -31.64
Third year -0.137 -50.57 -0.138 -51.65 -0.140 -49.85
Fourth year -0.173 -65.16 -0.173 -65.43 -0.176 -54.51
Fifth year -0.208 -72.88 -0.207 -72.66 -0.213 -40.85
Obs 105,798 105,798 105,798
Pseudo R2 0.1296 0.1343 0.1344
log(Likelihood) -43,085 -42,848 -42,845
49Table 4B: Probit Regressions (Dependent Variable: 1 if Low Deductible Chosen)
Variable (4) (5) (6)
dP/dX z − stat dP/dX z − stat dP/dX z − stat
Menu: ∆p/∆d -0.345 -12.92 -0.354 -13.83 -
d 0.00014 13.14 0.00014 12.83 -






- 0.0006 0.23 0.0208 11.52
Demographics: Age -0.004 -4.46 -0.004 -4.46 -0.004 -3.57
Age2 4.7*10−5 4.69 4.7*10−5 4.69 3.3*10−5 3.51
Female 0.010 3.31 0.010 3.31 0.016 6.04
Family Single 0.031 0.73 0.031 0.73 0.068 1.51
Married 0.025 0.63 0.025 0.63 0.066 1.84
Divorced 0.037 0.86 0.037 0.86 0.061 1.34
Widower 0.025 0.58 0.025 0.58 0.061 1.31
Education Elementary -0.0038 -0.42 -0.0038 -0.43 0.0041 0.47
High School -0.0018 -0.58 -0.0018 -0.58 -0.0012 -0.38
Technical 0.0138 2.59 0.0138 2.59 0.0087 1.68
Academic -0.0008 -0.19 -0.0008 -0.19 0.0096 3.05
Emigrant 0.0014 0.51 0.0014 0.51 -0.0011 -0.41
Car Attributes: Log(Value) 0.035 4.91 0.035 4.91 0.027 5.68
Car Age 0.0006 0.63 0.0006 0.63 -0.0032 -4.57
Commercial Car -0.033 -4.78 -0.033 -4.78 -0.017 -3.16
Log(Engine) 0.019 1.42 0.019 1.43 -0.014 -1.78
Driving: License Years -0.0006 -0.57 -0.0006 -0.57 0.0021 3.31
License Years2 -1.7*10−6 -0.12 -1.7*10−6 -0.12 -3.0*10−5 -2.53
Good Driver -0.013 -3.78 -0.013 -3.79 -0.015 -4.57
“Any Driver” -0.027 -8.27 -0.027 -8.27 -0.022 -8.23
Secondary Car -0.008 -1.95 -0.008 -1.95 0.0002 0.06
Business Use 0.009 1.05 0.009 1.05 -0.016 -3.00
History 0.015 4.17 0.015 4.17 0.023 7.84
Claim History 0.090 3.38 0.090 3.37 -0.010 -0.92
Young Driver: Age 17-19 -0.007 -0.41 -0.007 -0.41 -0.035 -2.58
19-21 -0.010 -0.72 -0.010 -0.72 -0.046 -4.86
21-24 -0.018 -1.49 -0.018 -1.49 -0.043 -4.39
>24 dropped dropped dropped
Experience <1 -0.017 -1.01 -0.017 -1.01 -0.056 -4.43
1-3 -0.033 -4.29 -0.033 -4.29 -0.041 -5.35
>3 dropped dropped dropped
Gender Male 0.053 4.32 0.053 4.32 0.049 4.00
Female 0.068 4.85 0.068 4.84 0.095 6.82
Company Year: First year dropped dropped dropped
Second year -0.088 -22.74 -0.088 -22.74 -0.079 -29.57
Third year -0.135 -41.05 -0.135 -41.03 -0.130 -47.14
Fourth year -0.171 -33.99 -0.171 -33.98 -0.162 -56.23
Fifth year -0.215 -19.15 -0.216 -19.14 -0.192 -51.53
Obs 93,988 93,988 93,988
Pseudo R2 0.1399 0.1399 0.1365
log(Likelihood) -36,808 -36,808 -36,954
50Table 4C: “Structural Interpretation” of the Probit Regressions
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z − stat







Demographics: Age -0.16 0.05 -3.57
Age2 0.0016 0.0005 3.51
Female 0.78 0.13 6.04
Family Single 2.94 1.95 1.51
Married 3.57 1.94 1.84
Divorced 2.62 1.95 1.34
Widower 2.59 1.98 1.31
Education Elementary 0.20 0.42 0.47
High School -0.06 0.15 -0.38
Technical 0.41 0.25 1.68
Academic 0.46 0.15 3.05
Emigrant -0.05 0.13 -0.41
Car Attributes: Log(Value) 1.30 0.23 5.68
Car Age -0.15 0.03 -4.57
Commercial Car -0.86 0.27 -3.16
Log(Engine) -0.69 0.39 -1.78
Driving: License Years 0.101 0.03 3.31
License Years2 -0.0014 0.0006 -2.53
Good Driver -0.71 0.15 -4.57
“Any Driver” -1.07 0.13 -8.23
Secondary Car 0.01 0.16 0.06
Business Use -0.80 0.27 -3.00
History 1.12 0.14 7.84
Claim History -0.49 0.53 -0.92
Young Driver: Age 17-19 -1.86 0.72 -2.58
19-21 -2.54 0.52 -4.86
21-24 -2.32 0.53 -4.39
>24 dropped
Experience <1 -3.21 0.72 -4.43
1-3 -2.18 0.41 -5.35
>3d r o p p e d
Gender Male 2.12 0.53 4.00






This regression is a replication of column (6) from Table 4B. It presents a structural interpretation of the results by
reporting coeﬃcients (not changes in probabilities) and renormalizing the coeﬃcients by the coeﬃcient on the cutoﬀ
point (freeing up the variance of the error term). This, together with the assumption that the coeﬃcient of absolute
risk aversion, r, follows a Lognormal distribution, allows us to interpret the coeﬃcients as if it is a linear regression in
which the dependent variable is log(r). One should be cautious in interpreting these coeﬃcients, however. Unlike the
full structural model, this regression does not allow unobserved heterogeneity in risk and suﬀers from some selection
bias because observations with “too high” predicted risk rate are omitted. Thus, it is only useful for comparison.
51Table 5: The Benchmark Model
Variable Dep Var: log(λ) Dep Var: log(r)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Demographics: Constant -1.572 0.007 -11.629 0.096
Age -0.0001 0.0006 0.0035 0.005
Female 0.004 0.008 0.161 0.061
Family Single 0.0063 0.100 0.513 0.778
Married 0.0493 0.099 0.598 0.773
Divorced 0.1030 0.099 0.231 0.779
Widower 0.0740 0.102 0.394 0.791
Education Elementary -0.069 0.028 0.406 0.192
High School -0.053 0.011 0.313 0.080
Technical -0.063 0.017 0.570 0.114
Academic -0.083 0.012 0.525 0.078
Emigrant -0.0023 0.0094 0.0197 0.0661
Car Attributes: Log(Value) 0.085 0.017 0.735 0.117
Car Age -0.0022 0.0022 0.0019 0.0163
Commercial Car -0.074 0.018 -0.002 0.120
Log(Engine) 0.172 0.023 -0.532 0.180
Driving: License Years -0.0019 0.0007 0.005 0.005
Good Driver -0.058 0.010 -0.137 0.072
“Any Driver” -0.055 0.0097 -0.197 0.067
Secondary Car -0.034 0.014 0.075 0.087
Business Use 0.050 0.014 -0.331 0.110
History -0.002 0.005 0.296 0.046
Claim History 0.144 0.016 -0.060 0.159
Young Driver: Age 17-19 0.054 0.016 -
19-21 -0.035 0.012 -
21-24 -0.031 0.013 -
>24 0.032 0.011 -
Experience <1 -0.004 0.011 -
1-3 0.089 0.012 -
>3 dropped -
Gender Male 0.038 0.006 -
Female dropped -
Company Year: First year dropped dropped
Second year -0.342 0.010 -0.441 0.177
Third year -0.222 0.014 -1.987 0.129
Fourth year -0.283 0.015 -2.983 0.148
Fifth year -0.540 0.024 -3.028 0.150
σ 0.172 0.009 2.986 0.062
ρ 0.861 0.026
Obs 105,798
52Table 6: CARA utility
Variable Dep Var: log(λ) Dep Var: log(r)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Demographics: Constant -1.583 0.007 -10.286 0.065
Age -0.0006 0.0006 0.0053 0.0032
Female 0.009 0.009 0.067 0.051
Family Single 0.030 0.081 0.439 0.613
Married 0.012 0.080 0.548 0.611
Divorced 0.064 0.081 0.262 0.621
Widower 0.040 0.084 0.379 0.630
Education Elementary -0.061 0.031 0.317 0.143
High School -0.034 0.010 0.196 0.056
Technical -0.035 0.017 0.323 0.090
Academic -0.063 0.011 0.354 0.059
Emigrant 0.0012 0.0079 0.0003 0.0435
Car Attributes: Log(Value) 0.043 0.015 0.726 0.098
Car Age -0.0017 0.0020 0.0069 0.0116
Commercial Car -0.086 0.017 0.162 0.083
Log(Engine) 0.172 0.021 -0.523 0.133
Driving: License Years -0.0015 0.0007 0.0031 0.0037
Good Driver -0.057 0.009 -0.046 0.049
“Any Driver” -0.053 0.009 -0.070 0.049
Secondary Car -0.027 0.012 0.066 0.061
Business Use 0.053 0.014 -0.275 0.080
History 0.002 0.005 0.178 0.038
Claim History 0.155 0.017 -0.264 0.118
Young Driver: Age 17-19 0.067 0.017 -
19-21 -0.023 0.012 -
21-24 -0.024 0.013 -
>24 0.028 0.012 -
Experience <1 -0.005 0.011 -
1-3 0.071 0.012 -
>3 dropped -
Gender Male 0.030 0.006 -
Female dropped -
Company Year: First year dropped dropped
Second year -0.249 0.007 -0.436 0.147
Third year -0.224 0.014 -1.024 0.086
Fourth year -0.289 0.016 -1.563 0.098
Fifth year -0.515 0.023 -1.345 0.104
σ 0.211 0.008 1.522 0.031
ρ 0.852 0.021
Obs 105,798
This regression is a replication of Table 5 for a CARA utility speciﬁcation, i.e. the deductible choice is given by
equation (8).
53Table 7: Implications for risk aversion levels
Speciﬁcationa ARAb Interpretationc RRAd
Benchmark (mean) 1.6 · 10−3 61.27 81.87
Benchmark (median) 7.8 · 10−6 99.72 0.40
CARA (mean) 1.9 · 10−4 93.76 9.67
CARA (median) 3.0 · 10−5 98.96 1.52
Incomplete Info (mean) 1.1 · 10−3 70.91 56.28
Incomplete Info (median) 1.5 · 10−6 99.95 0.08
Gertner (1993) 3.1 · 10−4 96.99 4.79
Metrick (1995) 6.6 · 10−5 99.34 1.02
Holt and Laury (2002)e 3.2 · 10−2 20.96 865.75
a This table summarizes the results with respect to the level of risk aversion. “Benchmark” refers to the results
from the benchmark model (Table 5), “CARA” refers to a speciﬁcation of a CARA utility function (Table 6), and
“Incomplete Info” refers to a speciﬁcation in which individuals do not know their risk types perfectly (Table 9). The
last three rows are the closest comparable results available in the literature.
b The second column presents the point estimates for the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, converted to $US−1
units. For Gertner (1993), Metrick (1995), and Holt and Laury (2002) this is given by their estimate of a representative
CARA utility maximizer. For all other speciﬁcations, this is given by computing the unconditional mean and median
in the population. This accounts for the variation in observables as well. Since we use Gibbs sampler, we augment
the latent individual risk aversion levels into the estimation, so computing the mean and median from the posterior
distribution is straightforward.
c To interpret the ARA estimates, we translate them into the following quantity{x : u(w)= 1
2u(w + 100)+1
2u(w − x)}.
Namely, we report x such that an individual with the estimated ARA is indiﬀerent about participating in a ﬁfty-ﬁfty
lottery of gaining 100 $US and losing x $US. Note that since our estimate is of absolute risk aversion, the quantity
x is independent of w. To be consistent with the speciﬁcation, we use a quadratic utility function for the benchmark
and incomplete information cases, and use a CARA utility function for the others.
d The last column attempts to translate the ARA estimates into relative risk aversion. We follow the literature,
and do so by multiplying the ARA estimate by average annual income. For this, we use the average annual income
(after tax) in Israel in 1995 (from Israeli census) for all our speciﬁcations, and we use average disposable income in
the US in 1987 for Gertner (1993) and Metrick (1995), which is the same number used by Gertner (1993). For Holt
and Laury (2002) we use a similar ﬁgure for 2002.
e Holt and Laury (2002) do not report a comparable estimate. The estimate we provide above is based on
estimating a CARA utility model for the 18 subjects in their experiment who participated in the “×90”t r e a t m e n t ,
which involved stakes comparable to our setting. For these subjects, we assume a CARA utility function and a
Lognormal distribution of their coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. The table reports the point estimate of the mean
from this distribution.
54Table 8: Experienced Drivers
Variable Dep Var: log(λ) Dep Var: log(r)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Demographics: Constant -1.597 0.008 -11.441 0.100
Age 0.0001 0.0007 0.0095 0.0051
Female 0.006 0.011 0.102 0.078
Family Single 0.048 0.107 0.507 0.821
Married 0.045 0.106 0.532 0.813
Divorced 0.106 0.107 0.151 0.826
Widower 0.067 0.111 0.304 0.848
Education Elementary -0.098 0.035 0.519 0.206
High School -0.043 0.012 0.256 0.085
Technical -0.054 0.018 0.533 0.127
Academic -0.090 0.013 0.550 0.083
Emigrant -0.0059 0.0096 0.052 0.067
Car Attributes: Log(Value) 0.070 0.021 0.801 0.139
Car Age -0.0029 0.0027 -0.0001 0.018
Commercial Car -0.090 0.021 0.098 0.129
Log(Engine) 0.186 0.026 -0.681 0.197
Driving: License Years -0.002 0.0009 -0.002 0.006
Good Driver -0.054 0.011 -0.161 0.076
“Any Driver” -0.055 0.011 -0.191 0.073
Secondary Car -0.039 0.014 0.112 0.087
Business Use 0.050 0.015 -0.347 0.115
History -0.010 0.007 0.314 0.064
Claim History 0.195 0.021 -0.325 0.187
Young Driver: Age 17-19 0.070 0.017 -
19-21 -0.038 0.016 -
21-24 -0.010 0.017 -
>24 0.023 0.016 -
Experience <1 0.012 0.014 -
1-3 0.072 0.017 -
>3 dropped -
Gender Male 0.041 0.008 -
Female dropped -
Company Year: First year dropped dropped
Second year -0.352 0.012 -0.526 0.197
Third year -0.241 0.015 -1.920 0.126
Fourth year -0.303 0.017 -2.941 0.153
Fifth year -0.551 0.026 -2.967 0.155
σ 0.188 0.009 2.930 0.070
ρ 0.784 0.037
Obs 82,964
This regression is a replication of Table 5 for only experienced drivers, i.e. drivers who had driving license for ten
years or more.
55Table 9: Incomplete Information of Risk Type
Variable Dep Var: log(λ) Dep Var: log(r)
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Demographics: Constant -1.680 0.006 -13.441 0.180
Age 0.0003 0.0008 0.013 0.007
Female 0.004 0.011 0.181 0.103
Family Single 0.005 0.110 1.550 1.715
Married -0.068 0.109 1.592 1.715
Divorced 0.012 0.109 1.526 1.713
Widower -0.010 0.111 1.542 1.715
Education Elementary -0.089 0.038 0.713 0.294
High School -0.032 0.012 0.345 0.120
Technical -0.030 0.022 0.662 0.193
Academic -0.077 0.014 0.670 0.126
Emigrant 0.0114 0.0106 -0.035 0.101
Car Attributes: Log(Value) 0.131 0.018 1.924 0.201
Car Age 0.002 0.0026 -0.019 0.025
Commercial Car -0.110 0.022 0.283 0.177
Log(Engine) 0.241 0.027 -1.125 0.286
Driving: License Years -0.0034 0.0009 0.010 0.008
Good Driver -0.0778 0.0112 -0.237 0.107
“Any Driver” -0.086 0.011 -0.230 0.103
Secondary Car -0.039 0.014 0.112 0.129
Business Use 0.076 0.018 -0.679 0.180
History -0.018 0.007 0.424 0.086
Claim History 0.336 0.024 -0.824 0.290
Young Driver: Age 17-19 0.148 0.021 -
19-21 0.044 0.023 -
21-24 0.045 0.024 -
>24 0.108 0.023 -
Experience <1 -0.046 0.020 -
1-3 0.065 0.023 -
>3 dropped -
Gender Male 0.028 0.011 -
Female dropped -
Company Year: First year dropped dropped
Second year -0.410 0.010 -1.586 0.423
Third year -0.426 0.013 -2.156 0.164
Fourth year -0.569 0.015 -3.400 0.209
Fifth year -0.883 0.019 -3.333 0.208
σ 0.279 0.010 3.377 0.105
ρ 0.723 0.042
Obs 105,798
This regression estimates a speciﬁcation of the model where individuals do not have complete information about
their risk types. Individuals are Bayesian and update their information from past claims history. We discuss this
speciﬁcation in the end of Section 4. The end of Appendix A provides the technical details.
56Table 10: Representativeness
Variable Sampleb Populationc Car Ownersd
Agea 41.14 (12.37) 42.55 (18.01) 45.11 (14.13)
Female 0.316 0.518 0.367
Family Single 0.143 0.233 0.067
Married 0.780 0.651 0.838
Divorced 0.057 0.043 0.043
Widower 0.020 0.074 0.052
Education Elementary 0.029 0.329 0.266
High School 0.433 0.384 0.334
Technical 0.100 0.131 0.165
Academic 0.438 0.155 0.234
Emigrant 0.335 0.445 0.447
Obs 105,800 723,615 255,435
a For the age variable, the only continuous variable in the table, we provide both the mean and the standard
deviation (in parentheses).
b The ﬁgures are identical to those presented in Table 1. The family and education variables are renormalized so
they add up to 1 (i.e. we ignore those individuals for which we do not have family status or education level). This is
particularly relevant for the education variable, as those who did not report it have probably not done so at random.
c This column is based on a random sample of the Israeli population as of 1995. We use only adult population,
i.e. individuals who are 18 years old or more.
d This column is based on a subsample of the population sample. The data only provides information about car
ownership at the household level, not at the individual level. Thus, according to our (rough) deﬁnition, an individual
is a car owner if one of the following two conditions apply: (i) the household owns at least one car, and the individual
is the head of the household; or (ii) the household owns at least two cars, and the individual is the spouse of the head
of the household.
57Figure 1: Variation in the Deductible Cap Over Time





















This graph presents the variation in the deductible cap over time, which is the main source of (what we argue
to be) exogenous variation in the data. While we do not observe the cap directly, the cap can be pretty accurately
calculated from observing the menus oﬀered. The graph above plots the maximal regular deductible oﬀered to anyone
who bought insurance from the company over a moving 7-day window. The big jumps in the graph reﬂect changes
in the deductible cap.
There are three reasons why the graph is not perfectly smooth. First, in few holiday periods (e.g. October 1995)
there are not enough sales within a 7-day window, so none of those sales hits the cap. This gives rise to temporary
jumps downwards. Second, the pricing rule applies at the date of the price quote given to the potential customer.
Our recorded date is the ﬁrst date the policy becomes eﬀective. The price quote is held for a period of 2-4 weeks,
so in periods in which the pricing changes, we may still see new policies which are sold using earlier quotes, made
according to the previous pricing regime. Finally, even within periods of constant cap, the maximal deductible varies
slightly (variation of less than 0.5%). We do not know the source of this variation.






























































2 , which according to the model we present in Section 3.1 is the relevant space for the deductible
choice. The goal is to provide some feel for the (unconditional) variation in menus we have in the data. The thick
vertical line at 0.3 is driven by the pricing formula for individuals who do not hit the deductible cap. For individuals
who hit the deductible cap (approximately one third of the data), the prices are higher, but the deductibles are ﬁxed,
so the ratio increases. One can see multiple “soft” horizontal lines. Each such line reﬂects a diﬀerent level of the
deductible cap, as shown in Figure 1.














This graph illustrates the individual’s decision problem. An individual is a point in the above two-dimensional
space. Each two deductible-premium combinations can be translated to an indiﬀerence set of points, given by the
downwards sloping curve. If an individual is either to the right of the line (high risk) or above the line (high risk-
aversion), the lower deductible would be optimal. Adverse selection is captured by the fact that the line is downward
sloping: higher risk individuals require lower levels of risk aversion to make the low deductible choice. Thus, in the
absence of correlation between risk and risk aversion, higher risk individuals are more likely to choose higher levels
of insurance.
Two other important things to note about the graph. First, an individual with λi >
∆pi
∆di will choose lower
deductible even with risk-neutrality, i.e. with probability one (we do not allow individuals to be risk-loving). This
does not create an estimation problem because λi is not observed, only a posterior distribution for it. Any such
distribution will have a positive weight on values of λi which are below
∆pi
∆di. Second, the indiﬀerence set is a function
of the menu, and in particular of
∆pi
∆di and d. An increase in
∆pi
∆di will shift the set up and to the right, and an increase
in d will shift the set down and to the left. Therefore, exogenous shifts of the menus that make both arguments change
in the same direction can make the sets “cross,” and thereby allowing to nonparametrically identify the correlation
between risk and risk aversion.
60Figure 4: Graphical illustration of the results
This ﬁgure illustrates the results for the benchmark model in the space of (λi,r i). The solid line presents the
indiﬀerence set (equation (7)) applied for the menu faced by the average individual in the sample. The two dotted
lines present normalized marginal (lognormal) densities of λi and ri for the average individual, based on the point
estimates of the benchmark model (Table 5). The scattered points present 10,000 draws from the joint distribution.
The ﬁgure also illustrates how changing the deductible-premium menu is aﬀected by adverse selection. A higher price
(or higher low deductible) will shift the solid line up and to the right, aﬀecting some of the individuals who previously
chose a low deductible. Due to the positive correlation, these marginal individuals are relatively high risk, therefore
creating a stringer incentive for the insurer to raise the price of the low deductible.





















































































































































































This ﬁgure illustrates the results from the counterfactual exercise (see Section 4.3). On the horizontal axis, we
change the deductible beneﬁt of low deductible, ∆d = dh − dl, in all graphs. The top panel presents the additional
proﬁts from oﬀering the low deductible, the middle panel presents the fraction of consumers choosing low deductible,
and the bottom panel presents the average risk of those individuals who choose low deductible. The vertical line in
all graphs presents the actual level of low deductible, thereby providing some indication for the ﬁto ft h em o d e l .A s
the top panel shows, while oﬀering the “low” alternative raises proﬁts, these proﬁts could be higher by making this
alternative less attractive.
62Figure 6: Claim Distributions
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In the ﬁgure above we plot kernel densities of the claim amounts, normalized by the level of the regular deductible
(there is an additional fat tail outside the ﬁgure, which accounts for about 25% of the distribution). The thick line
presents the distribution of the claim amounts for individuals who chose low deductible, while the thin line does the
same for those who chose regular deductible. Clearly, both distributions are truncated from below at the deductible
level. The ﬁgure shows that the distributions are fairly similar, and that the probability of a claim falling above the
low deductible but below the regular deductible is very small (1.3%). This implies that assuming that only claim
rate matters for the deductible choice (but not the claim amount) is not very restrictive.
63